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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992) which 
provides: "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over, . . . 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity . . . ." 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The matter below is a divorce action and this appeal is from 
the final Supplemental Decree of Divorce and certain provisions of 
that Decree of Divorce, heard by the Third Judicial District Court, 
and the issues raised by the Cross-Appellant regarding those 
provisions within the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which did not 
equally divide the marital debts or equally divide the marital 
assets, and which ordered the Plaintiff to pay one-half of the cost 
of private school in addition to child support and day care 
expenses, and which ordered Plaintiff to maintain life insurance, 
naming Defendant as beneficiary, in excess of the alimony award. 
Further, this is an appeal from the Order on Commissioner's 
Recommendation, entered on or about June 23, 1992, which denied 
1 
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^ 
Plaintiff's motion to set aside his stipulation regarding child 
custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND DETERMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR APPLICABLE CASES, 
The following are the issues presented on appeal by the 
Plaintiff herein: 
1. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in 
failing to equally divide the marital debts and in failing to 
equally divide the marital assets? Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1), Dunn 
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
2. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in 
ordering the Plaintiff to pay one-half of the cost of private 
school in addition to the award of child support and one-half of 
the cost of school-related day care expenses? Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-7, et. seq., In re Marriage of Stern, 789 P.2d 807 (Wash. App. 
1990) . 
3. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in 
ordering the Plaintiff to maintain life insurance which named 
Defendant as beneficiary in excess of the alimony award? Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-5(1). 
4. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in 
denying Plaintiff's motion to set aside the stipulation regarding 
2 
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chi I(1 -ustc'3\ 7 Utah Code Ann. H30 - \ -i-. u 'tan Code Ann. ^ i, 
Moon v. Moi, nauahn v. Maughn, 770 
p
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 ' •• Hutchison v. Hutchisonf 649 P. 2d 3 8 
(Utah 1982) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The s tandard of r ev i ew on iipfio. Il I II i , i , i ! , e i _> „i ibuse of 
d i s c r e t i o n , - landai 'd a: t o . i l l i s s u e s . The t r i a l c o u r t h a s broad 
d i s c r e t i o n and so Ionq as t ha i d i s c r e t i o n i s o x e r c i s e d w±u i 
c o n f i n e s -* * : « p annpi i^f^
 u : s 
o! the S t a ; - . ; <ii mu ;-,o . jnq a s --• f a c t s rui r e a s o n s f o r t h e 
d e c i s i o n ur< - e t f o r t h iii::1- r n n r * it . in i 
corn l u s i . , , » , - iF,:,n • , tm. u,uui .. should d i s t u r b t h e 
r e s u l t i n g o r d e r . 
The a p p e l l a t e c o u r t should review tin1 l i i r t i i a l 1 indiin» . I I l i e 
t : i ::i a Il  j n idg€ n in I ::i< ; i I: .1 n ; ' " '! s i ear J > erroneous" s t a n d a r d . A t i nd lnq i s 
" c l e a r l y erroneous" when "although t h e r e - n d e n c e t o support i t , 
t h e rev iew ^<~mrf >*- * * - - t i : ^ -\/ • > mite 
nc .: n i s t a k e has been committed ." S t a t e v . 
Walker "4 > . : ; < 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final Supplemental Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, entered by the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, presiding, which, among other things, entered orders 
regarding the division of debt, division of marital assets, payment 
of child support, payment of private school costs, maintenance of 
life insurance, payment of alimony and attorney7s fees. The 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce from which the Defendant appealed 
and Plaintiff cross-appealed was signed and entered by the Third 
District Court on August 21, 1992. A Notice of Appeal was filed by 
Defendant and a timely Notice of Appeal was filed by Plaintiff on 
or about October 2, 1992. 
This appeal is also from a final order entitled Order on 
Commissioner's Recommendations, dated June 23, 1992, which order 
denied the Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his stipulation regarding 
custody of the minor children. 
The Plaintiff filed for divorce in the lower court. 
Responsive pleadings were filed. There was a bifurcation of the 
divorce proceedings, and a Decree of Divorce was awarded on 
February 18, 1992. All issues attendant to the divorce came on 
regularly for trial on March 24, 1992. The court took the matter 
under advisement and on June 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:30 a.m., 
4 
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the court informed counsel as to Hie court's decii-
iii.il" f e r s iindi'i n1v i s o n u MIII "IIHlio .supplemental Decree of i -ot^t- etna 
Supplemental Findings or fact a- Conclusions of Law were signed 
una entered ri +* -vo— a ui ai < 'o ' ?. 
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motion and n aintiff i i led a i ae: Objectior --*> Commissioner's 
Recommendatxuii ana onorable 
Judge James S, Sawaya. The lower -QUI * lenied hear, ry 
Minute Entr\ dated a.*l\ }' **• :en -M1 P I ^ i nt i ^+-'^ „r*..;,. | 
-- * >- s au Leen 
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Recommendation and final Supplemental Decree of Divorce, the 
appellee has filed a timely cross-appeal herein. (Said 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Order on Commissioner's 
Recommendations are attached hereto, designated as Addendum "A", 
Addendum "B" and Addendum "C" respectively,) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married to each other in May, 1977 (TR, p. 3, 
11. 21 and 22.) The parties have two children born as their issue, 
Kira, who was age 10 at the time of trial, and Erika, who was age 
5 at the time of trial (TR, p. 4, 11. 1-4). The parties separated 
in June of 1991 (TR, p. 4, 11. 5-7). 
The parties stipulated to physical custody in Defendant at the 
time of trial (TR, p. 4, 11. 15-57). 
Plaintiff was employed by Kennecott Corporation at the time of 
trial and testified regarding his base salary and the fact that he 
received commissions which varied each year. (See TR, pp. 12-21.) 
His 1992 income, as testified to at trial, was $114,500.00 (One 
Hundred Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars), which included a 
substantial bonus of $14,500.00 (Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars). (See TR, p. 18, 11. 21-32, TR. , p. 21, 11. 18-24.) 
Based upon that annual income, the Plaintiff offered to pay child 
6 
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support pursuant to - no -'hiio °uppon- Obligation Worksheet wh i ch 
was marked „i -, • ; "I'l  n L'Laint 1 M 's gross 
monthly income oi v^, 4,. =* mr- Thousand i- ^ e Hundred Forty Two 
Dollars), pursuant r ^ f guidelines. <^ ; i *- I 
£-«.-s.'i ^-lenaa i. . , One 
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty * ne Dollars iv ot that exhibit 
is appended hereto, and desi<i r * • •. * . »# 
The Defendant worked o jifferent jobs aur . J:he r-arriacre, 
including running a day care center 01 it of ^h^ parties' ! ^ m* • 1 
1988 to iQ'«'»,i! „"i«i^  |, •
 vr< t h e 
primary wage earner and \ * ;
 : defendant was 
enrolled at; the Univers* *f v <^ J~t'<r ^fendant : 
I" - : 'i, I ' .; « Uie time u !i Ldi 
was pursuing 1 oegree Elementary Educai i »r= expected 
graduation '<*m within three vonv* n| 1 h« 1 
tesl mi n-.. & wnni ., • pursue a Masters Degree, which 
would take an additional *wo --ears. (See TR, • " > - c-
and • : bu • 111 t\ 
i -u-vi 01 , :.u iu , . .iuv.j: .n.i, process * *• * * Masters ir i ve 
years from Marcr, < -i*.- ' ru matter was tried before Judge 
Sawaya 
Defendant testified that with the classes that she had left to 
complete that she would have a Bachelors ±. .• « I! hi ,1 
7 
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( 
teaching certificate if she took two classes per quarter, in three 
years. (See TR, p. 182, 11, 21-25, p.183, 11. 1-10.) Again, she ' 
further indicated that she would have her Masters in an additional 
two years. (See TR., p. 183, 11. 11-16.) 
When questioned about her health, the Defendant testified that 
she did not agree that there was any concern about her health 
problems impacting on her ability to function as a mother and 
single parent. (See TR. , p. 148, 11. 14-20.) She indicated that 
with her medication, her medical condition was controlled. (TR, p. 
186, 1. 25, p. 187, 11. 1-7.) 
Defendant testified further, as follows: 
Q But you definitely plan on graduating in five 
years with a master's? 
A Yes. 
Q And entering the work force at that time? 
A Yes. 
(TR, p. 186.) 
Defendant testified at the time of trial that her monthly 
expenses were $3,198.00 (Three Thousand One Hundred Ninety Eight 
Dollars), and she submitted an exhibit setting forth those 
expenses. A copy of that exhibit is attached hereto as Addendum 
"E". 
8 
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The Defendant apparently stipule ten *r -^r "hi Id support award 
of • « equesx inytnmg other 
t h n * ie i . :ne 1 nousand Three Hundred Sixt\ sr < Dollars) 
offered ' • ~i •*. . >w<=»vf * * , Defendan4 : t 
P] . i ; • neret , one-hai
 ( - -it- t 5 the 
tu J t: i r :n • . MJ - rsii cir en ^ | «r > vat
 t : -not Cosgri t ' .*-*^  ^ •». 
14i . , . . . and 
specifical. ^tiii-o * ; M- support award that he was offering 
adequately covered 1) met the needs * • • .. ^ j irpn \~: ( ^ . the 
I1 "^ • -Jet.- ) 
/* -;'n- . *i~! \J: - ner testimony, the Defendant requested an 
award t *n > n^nv ^t ^s * < ihousanr s / 
another time i-*r ,nq ^-r testimony tie1 askecj - *r r ' Two 
Thousand !)n • a- .- ^ I 
l aiii ::i^:i\., >,tr: ' .'.* Defendant .ninony oi ' ,. ) . 00 
(Orv- Thousand One Hundred i)r iarsi r^r *M^r - H i t - ^  * ^^ 
receiv-no ri i 
th^ part.oL . „i.cvi -, , i,v -i-i
 t- -ti <- (See TR, 
2 5 , * M.idi t * .>!• - »-,. 1.1 . o* i * . offered an exh 
sh
 4,ivi -H e monthly 
income available to Defendant whi ch was marked and admitted as 
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i 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "7", a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum "F". < 
The parties had previously divided their other assets and 
property, and the only asset, other than retirement and IRAs, was 
the item referred to as the "Troy Receivable" which was explained 
to the court as follows: 
THE COURT: Let me see if I understand before we go 
too far and I lose track of this—they receive payments 
on a sale of a piece of property? 
MS. WILLIAMS: Property in Troy, Montana, it has 
over a fourteen thousand, five hundred balance. It pays 
out at the rate of two hundred dollars a month and his 
offer is that she receive that asset so that she can 
receive that two hundred per month income. 
Q This income is expected to be received for 
another eight or nine years—there;s no balloon due on 
it? 
A No. 
Q And based upon your allocation of earnings that 
would be your proposal? 
A Yes, it is. 
TR, p. 26, 11. 7-20. 
10 
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When the parties separated, they sold their house and 
Defendant had received approximately $25,000.00 (Twenty-Five 
Thousand Dollars). (See TR, p. 38, 11. 8-18.) 
At the time of trial, Plaintiff testified that there existed 
two remaining marital debts. A debt for $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars), representing a loan taken out by him to 
cover marital expenses incurred and a tax obligation of 
approximately $4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars). 
(See TR, p. 31, 1. 25, p. 32, 11. 1-11.) The Defendant did not 
dispute the existence of those debts in her testimony. 
Upon review of the transcript of trial, Plaintiff can find no 
request or testimony by Defendant regarding life insurance naming 
her as beneficiary. 
At the time of trial, Defendant testified that the initial 
$1,500.00 (One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) that she paid as a 
retainer for attorney's fees for her counsel came from joint 
marital funds. (See TR, p. 171, 11. 6-11.) Counsel for Defendant 
was sworn and testified that his attorney's fees were approximately 
$4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars), but was unspecific 
as to any expenses or costs incurred and had no statement or bill 
to verify any costs or his testimony regarding fees. (See TR, p. 
20, 11. 233-25, p. 201, p. 202, 11. 1-19.) 
11 
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At the close of trial, the court took the matter under 
advisement, indicating that the court clerk would provide counsel 
with a written list of issues to be addressed by Plaintiff's 
counsel and Defendant's counsel, in writing in lieu of closing 
arguments. (See TR, p. 213, 11. 9-25, p. 214, 11. 1-24.) No such 
written list of issues was presented to either counsel, and the 
court set the matter for hearing on June 22, 1992, at the hour of 
11:30 a.m., at which time the court informed Plaintiff's counsel 
and Defendant's counsel of the court's decision on the matters 
under advisement. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce and 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed 
and entered by the court on or about August 21, 1992. 
Prior to the June 22, 1992 hearing in chambers, however, and 
prior to the court making its decision and findings and after the 
divorce trial on March 24, 1992, the Plaintiff filed a Verified 
Motion to Withdraw Stipulation of Plaintiff. That motion was filed 
on or about April 17, 1992, and requested that Plaintiff be 
permitted to withdraw his stipulation relating to physical custody 
of the minor children. (A copy of that motion is appended hereto 
and designated as Addendum "G".) Subsequent to the Defendant's 
reply to the Plaintiff's motion, the matter came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third District Court 
Commissioner, on May 22, 1992. The Commissioner recommended the 
12 
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denial of Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff filed a timely Objection 
to the Commissioner's Recommendation and a Request for Hearing was 
made. The lower court denied hearing and, by Minute Entry, dated 
July 16, 1992, denied Plaintiff's motion. That Minute Entry 
adopted the Order on Commissioner's Recommendations, which was 
signed by the court and entered by the court as a final order on 
June 23, 1992, and which contents were further contained in the 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which awards Defendant the physical 
care, custody and control of the minor children. In addition, 
within the Supplemental Decree and Findings of Fact, the court 
awarded the sole legal custody of the children to Defendant, 
subject to Plaintiff's specified rights of visitation (FOF 1, Index 
248). Further, the court ordered the Plaintiff to pay child 
support in the sum of $1,361.00 (One Thousand Three Hundred Sixty 
One Dollars) per month (FOF 3, Index 250). The court acknowledged 
that the Defendant was currently unemployed and was pursuing a 
college degree and that no income should be imputed to her (FOF 3, 
Index 250). In addition, the court ordered the Plaintiff to pay 
Defendant one-half of all day care expenses paid by Defendant while 
she was working or attending classes at an accredited educational 
institution (FOF 4, Index 250). Further, the court ordered the 
Plaintiff to pay 50% (fifty percent) or one-half of the cost of 
13 
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1 
private school tuition through high school, which sum was to be in 
addition to base child support (FOF 4, Index 250). 
The court ordered Plaintiff to maintain a life insurance 
policy naming the minor children as beneficiaries in the base sum 
of $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollars). In addition 
thereto, the court ordered the Plaintiff to maintain a $100,000.00 
(One Hundred Thousand Dollar) life insurance policy during the 
period in which alimony is paid by Plaintiff to Defendant naming 
Defendant as beneficiary (FOF 8, Index 251). 
The court found, as well, that based upon the Plaintiffs 
income and based upon the Defendant's pursuit of her educational 
degree and considering her prior health conditions and her ability 
to support herself at the end of the educational term, that it was 
reasonable that the Plaintiff pay alimony to the Defendant at the 
rate of $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) per month for 
a period of 24 (twenty four) months, commencing June 1, 1992. The 
court further ordered that the alimony would reduce to the sum of 
$1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) per month for an additional 24 
(twenty four) months and terminate at the end of the four (4) year 
period. (FOF 10, Index 252.) 
The court also found that it was reasonable that the Defendant 
be awarded the "Troy Receivable," for an additional $200.00 (Two 
Hundred Dollars) per month. (FOF 14, Index 253.) 
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The court also found that it was reasonable that Plaintiff 
should pay the two debts testified to which were the RediCredit 
debt of $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) and the 
1991 tax obligation. (FOF 17, Index 254.) 
The court, lastly, found that Plaintiff should contribute the 
further sum of $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) to the Defendant's 
attorney's fees and costs incurred. (FOF 19, Index 254.) 
The Defendant filed her appeal to the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce, appealing the amount and term of alimony and the award of 
attorney's fees. The Plaintiff cross-appealed from the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce on the division of debts, payment of 
private schooling for the minor children, the obligation of 
Plaintiff to maintain life insurance for Defendant, and the post 
trial ruling and denial of Plaintiff's motion to withdraw or set 
aside his stipulation to child custody. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FAILING TO EQUALLY DIVIDE THE PARTIES' DEBTS AND/OR 
THE MARITAL ASSETS GIVEN THE LEVEL OF ALIMONY 
AWARDED. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the parties sold their 
marital residence prior to the time of trial and divided the equity 
between them. The Defendant received slightly more than did 
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Plaintiff, and received approximately $25,000.00 (Twenty-Five 
Thousand Dollars). (See TR, p. 38, 11. 8-18.) The only other 
assets of the parties were their IRAs and retirements and the "Troy 
Receivable." The court found that it was reasonable to equally 
divide all IRAs and retirements that had accrued during the marital 
period (FOF 16, Index 253). 
The "Troy Receivable" was from the sale of the parties' 
property in Troy, Montana, a different property than the marital 
residence, and there was a balance owing to the parties of over 
$14,500.00 (Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars), payable at 
$200.00 (Two Hundred Dollars) per month (TR, p. 28, 11. 7-20). 
Plaintiff offered that receivable to Defendant to assist her in 
lieu of further alimony, when the offer was made at the time of 
trial to pay alimony at the rate of $1,100.00 (One Thousand One 
Hundred Dollars) per month (TR, p. 25, 11. 1-25, p. 26, 11. 1-3, 
and also Addendum "F"). However, the Plaintiff also requested that 
there be an equal division of the marital debts, which included a 
debt of approximately $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars), representing a loan taken out by Plaintiff to cover 
marital expenses and a tax obligation owing by the parties of 
approximately $4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars) (TR, 
p. 31, 1. 25, p. 32, 11. 1-11). 
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While the court equally divided the retirements, and the 
parties had previously equally divided the proceeds from the 
marital residence, the court then awarded $1,500.00 (One Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars) in alimony, awarded the Defendant the entire 
asset known as the "Troy Receivable", at a value of $14,500.00 
(Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars), and ordered the Plaintiff 
to pay the debts and obligations which totaled approximately 
$11,800.00 (Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars). The court made 
this inequitable division of the assets and debts, without issuing 
findings or statements as to the reasonableness of that inequitable 
division. 
In dividing marital assets, "the overriding consideration is 
that the ultimate division be equitable — that property be fairly 
divided between the parties given their contributions during the 
marriage and their circumstances at the time of divorce." Newmeyer 
v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "Each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and 
50% of the marital property." Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 
(Utah App. 1990). The court must issue sufficient findings to 
demonstrate an award otherwise. Id. 
It is acknowledged that "the trial court is allowed 
considerable discretion in the division of marital property, so 
long as it exercises its discretion in accordance with the 
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1 
standards set by this state7s appellate courts." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 
P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990), citing Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 
118 (Utah App. 1990). The court in Dunn set forth various factors 
for the trial court to consider in fashioning an equitable property 
division and articulated those factors as follows: 
The amount and kind of property to be divided; whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; 
the source of the property; the health of the parties; 
the parties7 standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs and earning capacity; the duration of 
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties7 
ages at the time of the marriage and of divorce; what the 
parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary 
relationship the property division has with the amount of 
alimony and child support to be awarded. 
Dunn, at 1322, citing Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 
1987). 
In the instant case, the court did not issue any findings 
regarding why the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay all of the 
outstanding debt and Defendant be awarded the entirety of the asset 
known as the "Troy Receivable" of $14,500.00 (Fourteen Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars). In the instant matter, after payment of 
child support and the award of alimony of $1,500.00 (One Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars), the Defendant had monthly income to her of 
$2,861.00 (Two Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One Dollars). She also 
had equal division of the other marital cash and retirement assets. 
Given the fairly equivalent net income then available to the 
parties, it was neither fair nor equitable to not equally divide 
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the assets and debts. As in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the court should find that an equitable 
division is a one-half share of accrued marital assets. 
Admittedly, the Woodward case was referring to retirement assets, 
however, the concept and spirit of the case of Woodward v. 
Woodward. is that each party should receive 50% (fifty percent) of 
those assets acquired during the marriage, barring some unusual 
circumstance. Likewise, equity requires that if the parties are 
sharing the income received by the wage earner, that there should 
be some sharing of the marital debts. The trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding the Defendant $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars) in alimony, while failing to then divide the "Troy 
Receivable" and the marital debts. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE COSTS OF 
PRIVATE SCHOOL IN ADDITION TO THE AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT, 
ONE-HALF OF SCHOOL RELATED OR WORK RELATED DAY CARE, AND 
60% (SIXTY PERCENT) OF THE MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
The Plaintiff submits that the trial erred and abused its 
discretion in failing to comply with Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7, et. 
seq. The Uniform Civil Liabilities for Support Act specifically 
provides a child support obligation table, which table was used in 
the instant matter to calculate the appropriate level of support. 
(See Addendum "F".) In the instant matter, the court found that 
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the appropriate level of child support was $1,361.00 (One Thousand 
Three Hundred Sixty One Dollars) pursuant to the guidelines. (FOF 
3, Index 250.) The trial court also found that it was reasonable 
that the Defendant be paid one-half of all day care expenses 
incurred while she was working or attending classes. (FOF 4, Index 
250.) In addition, the court found that it was fair and equitable 
that Plaintiff pay 60% (sixty percent) of non-routine medical 
expenses not covered by insurance (FOF 7, Index 251). 
Each of the foregoing provisions are contemplated and provided 
for within §78-45-7, Utah Code Ann. However, the Child Support 
Guidelines, as they have come to be known, are presumptive, even 
though that presumption can be rebutted if the court awards an 
amount different than the guideline amount. (Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-7.2.) The foregoing provision requires that a written finding 
or specific finding on the record support the conclusion that 
complying with the Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not 
in the best interests of the child in a particular case, if the 
Guidelines are to be rebutted. (§78-45-7.2[3].) 
In the instant case, there was no specific finding that it was 
appropriate to deviate from the Guidelines or that the Guidelines 
were rebutted. In addition, given the fact that the Guidelines 
specifically provide for the calculation of base child support 
(§78-45-7.14), specifically provide for the sharing of medical and 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dental expenses (§78-45-7.15), and the sharing of child care 
expenses (§78-45-7.16), it is apparent that to award support in 
addition to the foregoing is contrary to the Guidelines, and would 
require a rebuttal of the Guidelines and a specific finding and 
reason therefore. 
In the instant case, the court, in addition to the awards set 
forth above, ordered the Plaintiff to pay one-half of all costs of 
private school tuition through high school. (FOF 4, Index 250.) 
Again, it is Plaintiff's contention that the Finding and Order is 
in error in that it does not comply with §78-45-7, and is support 
in addition thereto, and was not supported by the evidence adduced 
at trial. While Defendant testified that it was her desire that 
the court order the Plaintiff to pay one-half of private school 
costs (See TR, p. 140, 11. 6-8), the Plaintiff contested that 
request and specifically testified that the support award that he 
was offering adequately covered and met the needs of the children, 
including the cost of private school (See TR, p. 22, 11. 18-25, p. 
23, 11. 1-7). The trial court made no findings that the child 
support was inadequate, and that the court should then deviate from 
the Guidelines and award support on top of the support set forth in 
§78-45-7. Plaintiff would submit that since the legislature 
provides explicitly for awards of medical expenses and day care, 
that the legislature must have intended for all other costs and 
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expenses attendant to the needs of the child or children to be 
covered by the Guideline table. 
There are no cases in Utah on point. However, the Court of 
Appeals in Washington has addressed this issue in the case of In re 
Marriage of Stern. 789 P. 2d 807 (Wash. App. 1990). In that matter, 
the husband had been ordered to pay and contribute to the costs of 
private school tuition. In that case, the court found that there 
were no findings regarding the children's need for a private 
education or any findings that there would be a benefit that would 
inure to the children from attending a private school that would 
not inure to them from attending a public one. Because of that, 
the court found that the trial court had exceeded the limits of its 
discretion. Id. at 813, 814. (A copy of In re Marriage of Stern 
is attached as Addendum "H".) 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the court abused 
its discretion and erred in ordering the Plaintiff to bear one-half 
of the cost of private schooling in addition to payment of day 
care, medical expenses and base child support of $1,361.00 (One 
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty One Dollars) per month. 
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III. THE TRIAL ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE WHICH NAMED THE 
DEFENDANT AS BENEFICIARY AND IN DOING SO IN EXCESS OF THE 
ALIMONY AWARDED. 
The trial court awarded alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 (One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) per month, for a period of two (2) 
years, then reducing to $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) per month 
for an additional two (2) years. (FOF 10, Index 252.) The total 
of that sum is $60,000.00 (Sixty Thousand Dollars). The trial 
court found that it was reasonable that Plaintiff maintain a 
$100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollar) life insurance policy 
during the period in which alimony is paid by Plaintiff to 
Defendant, naming Defendant as beneficiary (FOF 8, Index 251). It 
is apparent that the amount ordered to be maintained is unjustified 
and not supported by the fact of the court's own order relating to 
alimony. Further, and of greater importance, is the fact that the 
court entered this order without evidence before it justifying the 
award. Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-5, governs the right of the court to 
make equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations and the parties. However, the award must be based upon 
the facts presented at the time of trial and based upon the needs 
and equities. In the instant case, the court made no findings as 
to the reason that it was ordering $100,000.00 (One Hundred 
Thousand Dollar) life insurance policy to be maintained, when the 
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total alimony award was $60,000.00 (Sixty Thousand Dollars). There 
was no specific request or testimony on the part of the Defendant 
requesting that life insurance be maintained, and there existed no 
basis for the award. The order that Plaintiff maintain life 
insurance naming Defendant as the beneficiary was an abuse of the 
court's discretion and in error. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION RE: CHILD 
CUSTODY. 
Subsequent to the time of trial and on or about April 17, 
1992, Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion to Withdraw Stipulation of 
Plaintiff (Addendum "G"). The basis of the motion was that the 
premises upon which the Stipulation to Custody were based, were 
found to be inaccurate premises in that subsequent to trial, the 
Defendant, who suffers from bipolar manic depression, was behaving 
in an irrational fashion, preventing visitation, verbally abusing 
Plaintiff's new spouse, and unnecessarily and inappropriately 
involving the children in the difficulties between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. That motion specifically outlines the behavior and 
basis for the motion to set aside the stipulation. 
Given the fact that the court had not made its decision on all 
other substantive issues, and given the fact that no decision was 
made by the court until June, it is obvious, in retrospect, that 
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the motion was timely and, more importantly, that the best 
interests of the minor children were at issue and should have been 
addressed. Utah Code Ann, §30-3-10 specifically states that "the 
court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties" in 
determining the care and custody of minor children in a divorce 
(§30-3-10[l]). Further, that statutory provision goes on to state 
that "in awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other 
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to 
act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the 
child frequent and continuing contact with the non custodial parent 
as the court finds appropriate" (§30-3-10[2]). Given the basis for 
the Plaintiffs motion, which included Defendant's irrational acts, 
irrational behavior in the presence of the children, and her 
failure to provide Plaintiff access to the children, it was and 
should have been clear at that time that the issue of best 
interests should have been addressed by the court. Our court has 
provided us with a number of factors to look at considering and 
determining what is in the "best interest" of the children for 
custody purposes. They include the following factors: 
The need for stability in custodial relationship and 
environment; maintaining an existing primary custodial 
bond; the relative strength of parent bonds, 
The relative abilities of the parents to provide care, 
supervision, and a suitable environment for the children 
and to meet the needs of the children; 
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\ 
Preference of a child able to evaluate the custody 
guestion; 
The benefits of keeping siblings together, enabling 
sibling bonds to form; 
The character and emotional stability of the custodian; 
and 
The desire for custody; the apparent commitment of the 
proposed custodian to parenting. 
Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) (See also Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). 
Given the Defendant's psychiatric history and the important 
issues raised in Plaintiff's motion, it was an abuse of the court's 
discretion to ignore the best interests issue and to not allow the 
court to investigate what was and is in the best interests of the 
minor children, Erika and Kira. By failing to permit Plaintiff to 
set aside the stipulation, the trial court put the Plaintiff in the 
position of having to file a Petition for Modification and having 
to overcome the substantial burden of changed circumstances 
reguired by the case of Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). 
Further, the case of Maughn v. Mauahn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah App. 
1989), specifically states "our reading of Hogge and its progeny 
suggests that on a petition for custody modification, the trial 
court should carefully scrutinize the facts behind the original 
award of custody. If the initial award was based on a thorough 
examination by the trial court of the various factors pertaining to 
the child's welfare, a rigid application of the change in 
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circumstances prong is in order." Maughn at 160. It is unknown, 
given the review of the custody issue and Plaintiff's motion to set 
aside his stipulation as to physical custody, whether the court 
would then feel it necessary to apply the rigid Hogge standard as 
articulated in Maughn or the less rigid standard later adopted in 
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989). 
Regardless of the burden of proof and burden placed upon 
Plaintiff by virtue of the court's failure to set aside his 
stipulation regarding physical custody of the children; since the 
focus of the court was to have been, and should have been, and 
should always be, the best interests of the minor children, the 
court abused its discretion in failing to allow Plaintiff to 
withdraw the stipulation and look into the issue of best interests 
of Kira and Erika. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE AWARD 
OF ALIMONY. 
The Plaintiff was 36 (thirty six) years of age at the time of 
trial (Financial Declaration, Index 104). Defendant was 35 (thirty 
five) years of age at the date of trial (Financial Declaration, 
Index 119). While the parties had been married for, approximately, 
14 (fourteen) years, Defendant was still youthful, engaged in a 
course of education, attending school in a part-time fashion and 
would obtain her Masters in Early Childhood Special Education 
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within five (5) years of the time of trial attending school part-
time. (See TR, p. 155, 11. 3-16.) Given the ages of the children 
at the time of trial, of ten (10) and five (5) (TR, p. 4, 11. 1-4), 
there was no apparent constraint prohibiting Defendant from 
attending school full time and thus completing her educational 
process in a much shorter period. 
Regardless, Defendant indicated that her mental infirmity did 
not prohibit her from continuing her educational process or 
functioning as a mother and single parent (TR, p. 148, 11. 14-20, 
p. 186, 1. 25, p. 187, 11. 1-7). 
Based upon the age of the Defendant and her ability to attain 
a Masters Degree in five (5) years or less, it was obvious to the 
court that she had no mental or physical infirmity or family 
obligation which would prohibit her from obtaining work and 
entering the work force within a reasonable period of time. 
Based upon all of those facts and circumstances, the trial 
court certainly did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
rehabilitative alimony. 
It is well settled and established law in the State of Utah 
that a trial court must consider the three prong test in 
determining an award of alimony: 
1. the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
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2. the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself; and 
3. the ability of the husband to provide support. 
See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). In the instant 
case, the trial court fairly and reasonably considered each of 
those fators. The court awarded $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars) per month in alimony, $1,361.00 (One Thousand 
Three Hundred Sixty One Dollars) in child support and $200.00 (Two 
Hundred Dollars) per month (the "Troy Receivable") for a total 
monthly income to her of $3,061.00 (Three Thousand Sixty One 
Dollars), for a period of two years, to reduce to $2,561.00 (Two 
Thousand Five Hundred Sixty One Dollars) at the end of that two-
year period and for an additional 24 (twenty four) months. 
As indicated, the Defendant, though unemployed, and though her 
children were school age, was voluntarily attending school only 
part-time. (See TR, p.155, 11. 3-7.) Attending part-time, it was 
anticipated that she would obtain her degree in Elementary 
Education with a Teaching Certificate within three (3) years, 
attending part-time. It was fair for the court to consider her 
ability to actually attend full-time and to give her incentive to 
complete her educational process by reducing the alimony after a 
period of two (2) years, at which point in time she could complete 
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a Bachelors Degree with a Degree in Elementary Education, and 
commence employment or part-time employment• 
The terminable alimony is appropriate in this case and has 
certainly been found to be reasonable in other cases of a like 
length marriage. In Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah 
App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals upheld an award of alimony of 
$150.00 (One Hundred Fifty Dollars) per month for five (5) years7 
duration after a marriage of 14 (fourteen) years. Again, in the 
case of Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court found that a 24 (twenty four) month award of alimony after a 
nine (9) year marriage was not an abuse of discretion. 
The amount of alimony awarded was fair and equitable, given 
the fact that the Defendant's total income for the first two (2) 
years after the entry of the Decree would be $3,061.00 (Three 
Thousand Sixty One Dollars). Defendant testified to monthly 
expenses of $3,198.00 (Three Thousand One Hundred Ninety Eight 
Dollars) per month. It is obvious that her request for $2,000.00 
(Two Thousand Dollars) per month alimony was more than her monthly 
expenses justified. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant's 
monthly expenses were inflated, as well, and that Defendant's real 
monthly expenses were $2,556.00 (Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty 
Six Dollars) (TR, p. 23, 11. 8-25), which expenses were contained 
in Plaintiff's Exhibit "6", attached hereto as Addendum "I". 
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It is evident from the testimony adduced by Plaintiff and by 
Defendant's own exhibit, that she did not need the alimony that she 
requested, and that the award of alimony more than paid her monthly 
needs and expenses. 
Defendant has asserted that the award of alimony should 
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards. As 
set forth above, the award that the court made was sufficient to 
meet the Defendant's monthly needs as articulated at the time of 
trial, both by Defendant, although somewhat inflated, and by 
Plaintiff and his exhibit provided to the court. The Plaintiff 
disagrees that the award of alimony should equalize the parties' 
income, however, footnote 3 of the case of Howells v. Howells, 806 
P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), reads as follows: 
Exact mathematical equality of income is not required, 
but sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on an 
equal footing financially as of the time of divorce is 
required. That is what has occurred in the instant case. 
Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, and a 
relatively short term marriage, age of the Defendant, her 
proceeding through school, and the substantial income that would 
come to her through the award of alimony, child support and the 
receipt of the "Troy Receivable," the award of alimony made by the 
court, and the declining award and the term of that alimony is fair 
and equitable and should be affirmed by this court. Even if the 
court finds that there were not sufficient findings made as to the 
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issue of alimony, the court need not reverse, and can sustain and 
affirm the trial court's findings, as the record is clear and 
uncontroverted that the award of alimony in this case is 
appropriate, and the court applied the Jones factors, articulated 
above. (See Asper v. Asper. 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah App. 1988.) 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION OR ERR IN 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
At the time of trial, the Defendant testified that she had 
paid attorney's fees and that the initial $1,500.00 (One Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars) that she had advanced were from joint funds 
of both parties. (TR, p. 171, 11. 3-11.) Defendant acknowledges 
that $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) should not be 
considered as part of the requested award of attorney's fees as it 
was from joint funds. The Defendant also testified that she had 
savings and testified as follows: 
Q Other than your reserves and savings, do you 
have any funds to pay your attorney's fees? 
A No. 
Q You don't desire to invade those funds do you? 
A No, I don't. 
TR, p. 171, 11. 15-19. 
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It is obvious to each of us that we would prefer not invading 
savings to pay bills and debts. However, the court ordered the 
Plaintiff to pay all marital debts and the Defendant was left with 
no marital debts, but her ongoing monthly expenses. In addition, 
the court awarded her one-half of the retirement and she had 
already been awarded more than one-half of the proceeds from the 
sale of the marital residence. The court also awarded her the 
"Troy Receivable" which had a value of $14,500.00 (Fourteen 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars). The Defendant did not establish, 
nor was there any evidence, that Plaintiff had any savings or funds 
available with which to pay attorney's fees or costs. The fact 
that Defendant received more than one-half of the marital assets 
and received a total award of monthly income from alimony, child 
support and the receivable of $3,061.00 (Three Thousand Sixty One 
Dollar), was certainly considered by the court in the appropriate 
level or need for attorney's fees. The Defendant simply did not 
establish a need to have her fees paid. The simple fact that she 
was unemployed was not sufficient as, after the payment of alimony 
and child support and receipt of the marital assets and estate, she 
was on an equal footing with Plaintiff. The Plaintiff disputes 
Defendant's allegation that there was any uncontroverted evidence 
or evidence at all that the Defendant had a need for financial 
assistance in her attorney's fees. 
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In addition, there was no evidence in the record that 
indicated that the Plaintiff had the ability to pay attorney's 
fees. 
Lastly, the testimony of Defendant's counsel did not permit 
the court to establish, with any specificity, what the exact fees 
were. In fact, Defendant's counsel testified that "this has not 
been an exceptionally difficult case other than the fact that there 
were numerous bank accounts which required discovery . . . the 
reasonableness amount of fees would be $4,300.00 as of the end of 
trial today." (TR, p. 201, 11. 15-24.) Upon question, the 
Defendant's counsel stated as follows: 
MS. WILLIAMS I would ask if you have a statement? 
MR. FANKHAUSER I don't have a total. I have been 
sending her periodic statements and I have a ledger 
statement. I can prepare one if the court desires. 
MS. WILLIAMS I would ask if there were earlier 
representations that there was a bill owing at the time of the 
pre-trial of $300.00, a bill owing to you at the time of pre-
trial? 
MR. FANKHAUSER I don't know if that was the amount. 
I would check again on the ledger. I would have to look 
and see how much was charged back against the $1,500.00, 
plus whatever costs incurred. I can't tell you exactly. 
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MS. WILLIAMS No questions. 
TR, p. 202, 11. 6-20. 
It was evident from the cross-examination of Defendant's 
counsel that he was uncertain as to the exact bill. He merely 
testified that he thought that $4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three 
Hundred Dollars) was a reasonable fee. He did not state that was 
his bill, he had no bill to present to the court, and he could not 
identify what his bill was at any particular time. There was not 
sufficient evidence presented to the court to establish what the 
reasonable fees were, or even to establish what the fees were. 
While Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) provides that the court can 
order either party to pay attorney's fees incurred, "before a court 
will award attorney's fees, the trial court must find that the 
requesting party is in need of financial assistance and that the 
fees requested are reasonable." (See Osguthorpe v. Qsauthorper 804 
P.2d 530 [Utah App. 1990] citing Bagshaw v. Bagshawr 788 P.2d 1057, 
1061 [Utah App. 1990].) Again, the Defendant failed both in her 
direct testimony to establish need, and in the testimony of her 
counsel to establish what the actual fee was. The case of Muir v. 
Muir. 841 P. 2d 736 (Utah App. 1991) cited by Defendant is not 
applicable to the case at hand, as that case required undisputed 
evidence of the reasonable of the requested attorney's fees and the 
needs of the individual requesting the same. Again, the 
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Defendant's counsel was unclear in his testimony as to the actual 
fees incurred and what was a reasonable fee. In addition, 
Defendant failed completely to show that she was in need of a 
contribution to her attorney's fees or in any different position or 
situation than was the Plaintiff, after the division of the marital 
estate and award of alimony and support. 
Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees should be affirmed or the court 
should enter its own order, ordering that each party should pay his 
or her own attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the trial 
court's determination regarding alimony and attorney's fees. The 
orders of the court that Plaintiff pay one-half of the cost of 
private schooling and maintain life insurance naming Defendant as 
beneficiary should be reversed. This matter should be remanded to 
the trial court for the entry of a judgment and a second amended 
decree for a redistribution of the marital debts and obligations 
and a reconsideration of the issue of best interests of the minor 
children Kira and Erika, and in whose physical custody they should 
be placed. Further, it is reasonable that each party be 
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responsible for his or her own court costs and attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this (W^X da^ of May, 1993. 
KEJJLiV f. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I, KELLIE F. WILLIAMS, hereby certify that two copies of the 
foregoing Appellee's Brief, were HAND DELIVERED to E. H. 
Fankhauser, 243 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah_84111, this 
^ day of May, 1993. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
j 
A D D E N D U M " A " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- Civil No. 914902308DA 
MARY E. RANDOLPH, Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled Court on March 24, 1992, at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock a.m., the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Court 
Judge presiding, and the plaintiff being present in person and 
being represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the 
defendant being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, E. H. Fankhauser, and the court having heard the 
testimony of the parties, and having received exhibits, and having 
the taken the matter under advisement, and a bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce being previously entered on February 18, 1992, and the 
court having issued it's findings and order to the parties' 
counsel on June 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:30 a.m., and based 
thereon, the court now makes and enters the following: 
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1. There have been two children born as issue of this 
marriage, namely: Kira A. Randolph, whose date of birth is 
December 15, 1981; and, Erika C. Randolph, whose date of birth is 
June 2, 1986. The defendant is a fit and proper person to be 
awarded the permanent physical and legal care, custody, and 
control of said minor children. 
2. It is reasonable that the plaintiff be awarded visitation 
with the minor children as follows: 
a. Alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Midweek visits, each Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m. 
c. Christmas visitation on Christmas Day, beginning at 
1:00 p.m. and continuing for a period equal to one-half of the 
children's total school vacation. 
d. Thanksgiving visitation in even years, which 
Thanksgiving visitation shall commence Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and Easter visitation in odd years, 
which Easter holiday shall be defined as from Friday from 6:00 
p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
e. The parties shall alternate the other holidays, and 
plaintiff shall have alternate holiday visitation on New Year's 
Day, Martin Luther King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. The visitation shall begin 6:00 
000243 
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p.m. the day before the holiday until 6:00 p.n; on the day of the 
holiday. 
f. Holiday visitations take precedence over weekend 
visitation and no changes shall be made to the regular rotation of 
the alternating weekend schedule. 
g. On Father's Day from 6:00 p.m. the day before 
Father's Day until 6:00 p.m. the day of Father's Day. 
h. One evening from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during 
the week each child's birthday and the plaintiff's birthday. 
i. Summer visitation for a period of four continuous 
weeks. Plaintiff is to provide written notice of those dates to 
defendant by May 1. The defendant shall have alternate weekend 
holiday and phone visitation during that period. However, each 
party shall be allowed two weeks per year of uninterrupted 
possession of the children for the purposes of vacation, provided 
that the same does not interfere with holiday visitation as set 
forth above. Each party shall provide the other, in writing, 
notice of that two week period at least thirty (30) days in 
advance. 
j. Should either or both of the children be involved in 
year-round school, then plaintiff shall have visitation for two 
two week periods, with written notice of those dates to the 
defendant at least thirty (30) days prior to visitation. 
Defendant would then have holiday and phone visitation during that 
time. 
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4. The plaintiff, in addition to the foregoing base child 
support, shall reimburse defendant one-half of all day care 
expenses paid by defendant while defendant is working or attending 
classes, at an accredited educational institution. If any actual 
expense attendant to the day care ceases to be incurred, the 
plaintiff may suspend making monthly payment of that expense while 
it is not being incurred without obtaining a modification of the 
child support order. Further, each party is ordered to pay fifty 
ercent, or one-half of the costs of private school tuition 
rhrough high school, which sum shall be in addition to base child 
4
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6. Plaintiff should be awarded the right to claim the 
parties' children as dependents for the purposes of the 
calculation of his state and federal income tax deductions. 
7. Plaintiff shall continue to maintain health insurance for 
the benefit of the minor children of the parties, as available 
through his employment, during the period of minority of each 
child. Any insurance premium costs paid by plaintiff for the 
minor children and attributable to the minor children, shall be 
deductible from base child support pursuant to statute. Defendant 
shall pay all routine medical and dental expenses, including 
routine office visits, physical examinations, immunizations, and 
prescriptions. The parties will share non-routine expenses not 
covered by insurance, with plaintiff paying 60% of that cost and 
defendant paying 40%. 
8. Plaintiff should maintain in full force and effect, a 
policy of insurance on his life, having a benefit payable on death 
in the minimum sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), 
with the parties7 minor children named as beneficiaries until the 
children have attained the age of eighteen (18) years or graduated 
from high school in due course, whichever last occurs. Further, 
s 00027)1 
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plaintiff should maintain in full force and effect, a policy of 
insurance on his life, having a benefit payable on death in the 
minimum sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), during 
the period in which alimony is paid by plaintiff to defendant. 
The defendant should be named as the beneficiary thereof until the 
termination of alimony. 
9. The bonds previously purchased for the minor children 
should be held in a formal trust agreement for the education and 
benefit of the minor children, and preserved and utilized for 
their education and benefit. 
10. Based upon the current income of the plaintiff and the 
lack of income on the part of defendant, and based upon the 
defendant's pursuit of an educational degree, and the prior health 
conditions of the defendant, and defendant's ability to then 
support herself at the end of that educational term, it is 
reasonable, necessary, and proper that the plaintiff pay alimony 
to defendant at the rate of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($1,500.00) per month for a period of twenty-four (24) months, 
commencing June 1, 1992. Thereafter, the alimony shall reduce to 
the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per month for an 
additional twenty-four months. At the end of the four year 
period, the alimony should terminate. Further, the alimony should 
terminate upon the death of the defendant, or defendant's 
remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs. 
000202 
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11. The personal property of the parties acquired during 
their marriage, and prior to the parties/ separation should be 
divided one-half to each. The parties should toss a coin, and the 
party winning the coin toss, should choose the first item, and the 
parties should then alternate and take turns choosing each 
personal property item until all items of personalty acquired by 
the parties during their marriage are divided, one-half to each. 
12. Plaintiff should be awarded his Ford Explorer and 
defendant should be awarded her Dodge Caravan. 
13. The parties have previously divided all marital banking 
accounts, and each party should be awarded any monies or accounts 
currently in his or her own name. 
14. The parties real property has previously been sold, and 
the proceeds divided. However, there also exists a receivable, 
known as the Troy House receivable, which should be awarded to 
defendant for her additional support. The defendant should also 
be awarded one-half of all monies received by the parties from the 
Troy House receivable, since the parties7 separation. 
15. That the costs of the storage of the personal property 
previously stored, and until the property is divided, should be 
divided one-half to each, and defendant should receive no 
reimbursement for the costs previously withheld by plaintiff. 
16. Each party should be awarded one-half of the plaintiff's 
IRA, 4OIK, ASARCO retirement, and Kennecott retirement, as of 
March 24, 1992. Any necessary Qualified Domestic Relations Orders 
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should issue to divide those funds. 
17. Plaintiff should pay the debts and obligation owing to 
Redi Credit and the 1991 tax obligation. 
18. Defendant should have her maiden name returned, and she 
should be known hereafter as "Mary E. Fox." 
19. Plaintiff should contribute the sum of One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00) to defendant's attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in this matter. 
20. Each party should execute and deliver any necessary 
documents to transfer the title and ownership of the property of 
the parties pursuant to the decree entered in this action. 
BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties have previously been divorced by a Decree of 
Divorce dated February 18, 1992. 
2. A supplemental Decree of Divorce should be granted in 
conformance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED THIS day of /$/7SA,4SG> ^~~ / 1992. 
JAMES S. SAWAYA 
District Court Judge 
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Approved as to form and content: 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant 
DATED: 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact to be served 
upon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in 
an envelope addressed to: 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
n on the I day of WWAMkD/\^/ , 1992. 
i |WV\7 
Secretary 
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARY E. RANDOLPH, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil NO. 914902308DA 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
3/ 7^/S^ 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for 
trial before the above-entitled Court on March 24, 1992, at the 
hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m., the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
District Court Judge presiding, and the plaintiff being present in 
person and being represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and 
the defendant being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, E. H. Fankhauser, and the court having heard the 
testimony of the parties, and having received exhibits, and having 
taken the matter under advisement, and a bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce being previously entered on February 18, 1992, and the 
court having issued it's findings and order to the parties' 
counsel on June 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:30 a.m.; and the court 
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having heretofore rendered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law; now, therefore, and for good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant is hereby awarded the permanent physical and 
legal care, custody, and control of the parties7 minor children. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded visitation with the minor 
children of the parties as follows: 
a. Alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Midweek visits, each Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m. 
c. Christmas visitation on Christmas Day, beginning at 
1:00 p.m. and continuing for a period equal to one-half of the 
children's total school vacation. 
d. Thanksgiving visitation in even years, which 
Thanksgiving visitation shall commence Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and Easter visitation in odd years, 
which Easter holiday shall be defined as from Friday from 6:00 
p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
e. The parties shall alternate the other holidays, and 
plaintiff shall have alternate holiday visitation on New Year's 
Day, Martin Luther King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. The visitation shall begin 6:00 
p.m. the day before the holiday until 6:00 p.m. on the day of the 
holiday. 
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f• Holiday visitations take precedence over weekend 
visitation and no changes shall be made to the regular rotation of 
the alternating weekend schedule. 
g. On Father's Day from 6:00 p.m. the day before 
Father's Day until 6:00 p.m. the day of Father's Day. 
h. One evening from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during 
the week each child's birthday and the plaintiff's birthday. 
i. Summer visitation for a period of four continuous 
weeks. Plaintiff is to provide written notice of those dates to 
defendant by May 1. The defendant shall have alternate weekend 
holiday and phone visitation during that period. However, each 
party shall be allowed two weeks per year of uninterrupted 
possession of the children for the purposes of vacation, provided 
that the same does not interfere with holiday visitation as set 
forth above. Each party shall provide the other, in writing, 
notice of that two week period at least thirty (30) days in 
advance. 
j. Should either or both of the children be involved in 
year-round school, then plaintiff shall have visitation for two 
two week periods, with written notice of those dates to the 
defendant at least thirty (30) days prior to visitation. 
Defendant would then have holiday and phone visitation during that 
time. 
k. Reasonable telephonic visitation before 8:00 p.m. 
1. Other times as agreed by the parties. 
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3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to defendant at 
the rate of One Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-One Dollars 
($1,361.00) per month, which support shall continue until the 
children attain the age of eighteen (18) years. In addition, 
plaintiff is ordered to reimburse defendant one-half of all day 
care expenses paid by defendant while defendant is working or 
attending classes, at an accredited educational institution. If 
any actual expense attendant to the day care ceases to be 
incurred, the plaintiff may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred without obtaining a 
modification of the child support order. Each party is ordered to 
pay one-half of the cost of private school tuition through the 
children's high school education. 
4. Defendant is entitled to mandatory income withholding 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. Section 62A-11-401, et. seq., if 
plaintiff falls in arrears in his child support obligation. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the right to claim the 
parties' minor children as dependents for the purposes of the 
calculation of his state and federal income tax deductions. 
6. Plaintiff is ordered to continue to maintain health 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children as available 
through his employment, during the period of minority of each 
child. Any insurance premium costs paid by plaintiff for the 
minor children and attributable to the minor children, shall be 
deductible from base child support pursuant to statute. Defendant 
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is ordered to pay all routine medical and dental expenses, 
including routine office visits, physical examinations, 
immunizations, and prescriptions. The parties are ordered to 
share non-routine expenses not covered by insurance, with 
plaintiff paying 60% of that cost and defendant paying 40%. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain in full force and effect 
a policy of insurance on his life having a benefit payable on his 
death, in the minimum sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.00), naming the minor children of the parties as 
beneficiaries until the children have attained the age of 18 years 
or graduated from high school in due course, whichever last 
occurs. Further, the plaintiff is ordered to maintain in full 
force and effect, a policy of insurance on his life having a 
benefit payable on death in the minimum sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), with the defendant named as 
beneficiary thereof, which policy shall remain in effect until the 
termination of alimony. 
8. The bonds previously purchased for the minor children are 
ordered to be held in a formal trust agreement for the education 
and benefit of the minor children and preserved and utilized for 
their education and benefit. 
9. Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant at the 
rate of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) per month, 
for a period of Twenty-Four (24) months, commencing June 1, 1992. 
Thereafter, the alimony shall reduce to the sum of One Thousand 
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Dollars ($1,000.00) per montn, for an additional Twenty-Four (24) 
months. At the t.ad of the four year period, alimony shall 
terminate, or upon the death of the defendant, defendant's 
remarriage, or cohabitation, whichever first occurs. 
10. The personal property of the parties acquired during 
their marriage, and prior to the parties7 separation shall be 
divided one-half to each. The parties are ordered to toss a coin, 
and the party winning the coin toss should choose the first item, 
and the parties shall then alternate and take turns choosing each 
personal property item until all items of personalty acquired by 
the parties are divided. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded his Ford Explorer and 
defendant is hereby her Dodge Caravan. 
12. Each party is awarded any other monies or accounts 
currently held in his or her name. 
13. Defendant is hereby awarded the Troy House receivable. 
14. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of the past and 
ongoing costs of the storage of the personal property of the 
parties. 
15. Each party is awarded one-half of the plaintiff's IRA, 
401K, ASARCO retirement, and Kennecott retirement from the date of 
the parties marriage and up until March 24, 1992. Any necessary 
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders shall issue to divide those 
funds. 
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16. Plaintiff is ordered to pay the Redi Credit debt and the 
1991 tax obligation. 
17. Plaintiff is ordered to pay One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) to defendant for her attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in this matter. 
18. Defendant is hereby restored her maiden name, and she 
shall be known hereafter as "Mary E. Fox." 
19. Each party is hereby ordered to execute and deliver any 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered in this 
action. 
DATED THIS 2/ ^ d a y of 1992. 
JA6ES S. SAWAYA 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and content: 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant 
DATED: 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing Supplemental Decree of Divorce to be served 
upon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in 
an envelope addressed to: 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1 on t h e I day of J^iAH(\Aa w , 1992. 
#kr%\Mtsfop.Wa^> 
Secretary 
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Baxr NoT* 
Attorney:for- Defendant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY E. RANDOLPH, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
ORDER ON COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Civil No. 914902308 DA 
Judge Sawaya 
Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Withdraw Stipulation, Motion to 
Strike and Motion to Enforce Visitation came on for hearing at a 
regular term of the above entitled Court, pursuant to Notice, May 
29, 1992 before Domestic Relations Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler. 
Plaintiff was present in person and represented by his Attorney, 
Kelly F. Williams. Defendant was present in person and represented 
by her Attorney, E. H. Fankhauser. The Court, having received the 
proffers of testimony and arguments of counsel, took the matter 
under advisement. The Domestic Relations Commissioner, after 
000227 
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premises, made recommendations pursuant to written Minute Entry 
dated June 4, 1990, to-wit: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike having been withdrawn by 
Plaintiff, no recommendation is entered thereon and the Motion to 
Strike is stricken. 
2. The Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw his Stipulation to 
Custody should be denied. Although no ruling has been issued by 
the Court from the trial held in this matter, evidence on all 
disputed matters has been received by the trial Judge. Plaintiff's 
Motion is therefore untimely. In addition, Plaintiff's Motion is 
prejudicial to the Defendant, who relied on the Stipulation for 
Custody in preparing and presenting her case at trial. 
3. Pending a ruling by the Trial Court on Plaintiff's request 
for summer visitation, the Plaintiff should be awarded thirty (30) 
continuous days of summer visitation, consistent with the Temporary 
Order entered in this matter. Consistent with Plaintiff's request, 
the visitation should commence on June 13, 1992. 
4. Both parties should be and are hereby enjoined from making 
derogatory remarks about the other in the presence of the children 
and both parties should be enjoined and are hereby enjoined from 
2 
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DATED this lay of June, 1992. 
BY THE O 
.JAMAS' S. SAWAYA 
STRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED: 
Q3s^^d^JkJ^(txJU^— 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER 
Pursuant to Article 4 "DOMESTIC RELATIONS" Section 6-401(2) 
(E), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, each party shall have 
ten (10) days from the date of the recommended Order made by Minute 
Entry to file written objections thereto; and further, the 
recommendations of the Commissioner shall be in effect as an Order. 
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, MMLING r CERTIFTCATR KW&VZ& tfr 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Kellie F. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 South Main 
Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 in accordance with 
Rule 4.504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, on this 
of June, 1992. 
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•LAINTirra 
EXHIBIT 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARY E. RANDOLPH, 
Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WORKSHEET (Sole Custody) 
Case No. 914902308 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
BASE AWARD CALCULATION: 
Number of Children 
Gross Monthly Income 
Previously Ordered & Paid Alimony 
Previously Ordered Child Support 
Present Family Obligation 
Adjusted Gross Monthly Income 
Base Combined Child Support Obligation 
Proportionate Share 
Share of Base Child Support 
Children's Portion of Medical and 
Dental Insurance Premiums 
Day Care Expenses 
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
ADJUSTED BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Mo 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
t h e r 
0 
0 
0 
n / a 
0 
0% 
0 
Father 
$9 ,542 
$ 0 
$ 0 
$ n/a 
$9 ,542 
100% 
$ 1 , 3 6 1 
$ — 
$ 1 , 3 6 1 
$ 1 , 3 6 1 
Con 
$ 
$ 
$ 
ib ined 
2 
9 ,542 
1 ,361 
0 
Adjusted Base Child Support Award 
Per Child $ 681 
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MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Defendant, Mary Randolph and 2 minor children 
Rent 750.00 
Renter's Insurance 20.00 
Food and household supplies 540.00 
(average $125.00 per week) 
Utilities 75.00 
Telephone 50.00 
Laundry and cleaning 50.00 
Clothing 150.00 
Medical/Defendant's therapy & medication 200.00 
(not covered by insurance) 
Dental 50.00 
Insurance - Medical Premiums (COBRA) 138.00 
(*) Child care (1/2 of $260 average) 130.00 
School - Private school for children 
Books, etc. - Cosgriff 140.00 
Entertainment, travel, recreation 200.00 
Incidentals (grooming, gifts, etc) 161.00 
Auto expense (estimated) 150.00 
Other Expenses 394.00 
Defendant's College - U of U 368.00 
Newspaper 16.00 
Magazines 10.00 
TOTAL $ 3,198.00 
(*) Summer camp $650.00 each child 
8 weeks comparable to child care 
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MARCUS P. RANDOLPH v. HART E. RANDOLPH 
Civil No. 914902308DA 
AT.T.nrATTON OF EARNINGS / PLAINTIFF'S INCOME 
Plaintiff's Gross Annual Income $114,500 
Less Personal Exemption 
Taxable Annual Income 
2,050 
$ 99, ) 
Estimated Annual Federal and State 
Income Tax ($99,250 x .35) $ 34,738 
Annual FICA and Medicare 
Total Annual Deductions 
NET ANNUAL INCOME 
Annual Debts and Child Support : 
Child Support ($1,361 per month) « 16,332 
Zions Bank / car loan ($648 per month) 7,776 
Zions Bank / overdraft ($250 per month) 3,000 
Support $ 27,108 
(S 39.839) 
$ 59,411 
Net Annual Income 
(after payment of alimony @ $l,100/mo) 
Less Total Annual Debts and Child Support 
Actual Annual Income Available to Plaintiff 
$ 59,411._„ 
•$ 27,108.00 
$ 32,303.00 
Actual Monthly Income Available to Plaintiff $ 2.691.92 
Monthly Income Available to Defendant; 
Alimony 
Child Support 
Receivable 
$1,100 
$1,361 
$ 200 
$2,661 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MAR1 E RANDOLPH, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
STIPULATION OF PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. 914902308DA 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
C O M E S NMW riH'i P l i A I N T T K F I "V nd t l i rouqh c o u n s e l , Kel _e r . 
W i l l i a m s , .pursuant - ;. ^ <.-• -- UJ nl .•* ^ i e J u d i c i a l 
Administrat ion lereby moves t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e a cour*. 
e n t e r .• ^ f f t .< :) v 
to the issue of custody In the above captioned matter. 
SAID MOTION is made for the following reasons: 
1. That the plaintiff ori gl nal l/y I iled a Compla i jit. loi 
Divorce requesting custody of the parties' two minor children, 
Ki ra, whose dat .e c if bi rth i s December 5, 1981, and Erika, whose 
date of birth is June 2, 1 986. Prior to an evaluation being 
completed the plaintiff withdrew his request for custody and 
stipulated at I.he t imo uf ti ial that defendant may be awarded the 
»'««U»u»!.»U-p.lHJ.UI,ail<| 
-' m- a; •.*".wwjiaBayp8 <***tm-..l.t?Ti*~. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his r request f orr custody*; and- entered into the stipulation based 
upon faulty premises. One premise was that the defendant, who 
has previously been involuntarily hospitalized for her mental 
illness, had stabilized with medication and was able to care 
adequately for the children. A second premise was that the 
defendant, who, except for Christmas, had been permitting 
visitation, would not inhibit visitation between the plaintiff 
and the minor children. Thirdly, the stipulation was premised 
upon the fact that the plaintiff had formed a new relationship 
with a woman, to whom he is now married, and with whom the 
children were not acquainted and plaintiff was concerned that it 
would be difficult for the children to bond with a step-mother, 
under the circumstances. 
2. The defendant suffers from an incurable mental illness 
that is currently being treated with Lithium Carbonate. Her 
symptoms have included irrational acts, an inability to make 
decisions, and paranoia. While the defendant is under 
prescription for Lithium, plaintiff understands that if she does 
not continue to take it on a regular basis, it will bring on 
another episode. 
Defendant's first episode occurred in the middle of January 
1990. At that time, she became deeply religious and began 
attending mass at least once a day, spent large quantities of 
money on religious ornaments, ignored the children and her family 
responsibilities and became very difficult to communicate with. 
2 0001GI 
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Her conditior ^grsened-. until IFeforuaxyiwhen she- began psychiatric 
counseling. The recommendation was that she be committed to a 
psychiatric hospital - voluntarily consented » re 1 un; I, an t ly, 
and was .ulim i ! 1 fill Hospital :i n Belmont, Massachusetts, 
in February. She was diagnosed nh manic, treated with 
antipsychotics,- and! released - .. w^eK*, later,. Her ongoing 
t reatmenl up/in i :eJ ease was to continue monthly sessions with a 
psychiatrist, take daily medication of Lithium, avoid stress iiniiJ 
get a r sleep. 
D< . second manic episode occurred In February 1991, 
after siu began experimenting with reduced dosage :J£ 1 i th i urn 
The defendant c manic and completely 
discontinued taking •« lithium. * - ;u:t taking her 
thyroid medication, called Synthroid. * .-*: P-
threateni- SI i€ began skipping her psychiatric counseling 
March 18, without warning, ;* drove : )enver *.v. • :, vie uiiii n, 
having left without packinc it>* children. 
1 1 a I iiti f :f k as • : >nt acted by defendant s family, who asked that 
plaintiff pick up defendant immediately because her cone 
upsetting -i ister who was then ei ght months pregnant , Plaintiff 
went n r> h i.s i amily. Upon returning t- Sa ; t 
Lake City, defendant immediately left i_ ie household ^ t 
several nights Ln a women's she .- ^ - one o: - -i minor 
"-hi 1 a r^it, i • " MI II i ng she was afraid : c> : :• home because plaintiff 
would beat her "1 1 lat : 1 las never occurred. She refused I: :x> be 
admitted to the hospi ta ] , I: i i t: agreed to a counseling session with 
000102 
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Western Institute of Neuropsychology and remained there for 
several days. During that time she refused all medication. 
Further, while she was at Western Institute she was evaluated by 
two psychiatrists, both of whom recommended that she be required 
to submit to a competency hearing. The bases for that 
recommendation included a physical attack on her doctor and the 
hospital staff, an attempt to light a garbage can on fire, her 
continual refusal to take medication and physical violence which 
required her to be placed in physical restraints and isolation. 
On April 5, after a hearing before the Third District Court 
Mental Health Commissioner, defendant was involuntarily committed 
to the psychiatric ward at the University of Utah Hospital for a 
period of 30 days. Upon first being committed and despite a court 
order to force medication upon her, defendant refused medication 
and was required to be restrained and injected with Haldol. 
After a period of approximately one week she recommenced taking 
Lithium and was subsequently released. 
3. The parties were divorced pursuant to a bifurcated 
divorce proceeding on February 18, 1992. Thereafter, the 
plaintiff introduced the children to his now wife and made 
defendant aware of the expected permanency of that relationship. 
This matter proceeded to a trial, including testimony, on March 
24, 1992. 
4. By the time of the trial, the plaintiff began having 
concerns regarding the defendant's mental health and her 
0U01G3 
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the child ion. L)ui» I o t h« IH'PVIOILS stipulation entered into 
regarding custody, plaintiff pursued joint legaJ iufoluily ml 1 lie 
children but was silent regarding physical custody of the 
i "h i hirer!. 
5 Since the parties' divorce and since the defendan 
discovery that the plaintiff had a new relationship which has now 
resulted i n ma rr i age,,, the ! iefenciam 1: las been become i iicreasingly 
difficult and irrational Plaintiff believes that the defendant 
is iiiiwii 1 I! i nq lu accept the fact that the children are developing 
a relationship with plaintiIf's spouse, Lee, • - . -
that the defendant is attempting to lo everything she can 
prevent 1 .he ch :i 1 dren from being with plaintiff. For example: 
Defendant has denied plaintiff visitation ri gh ts 
with the minor children thereby requiring plaintiff to obtain a 
court ordei 
:• Defendant has failed to have the children ready for 
plaintiff at J ^  agreed time and has failed to be at her home 
whei i pi • r eq ui i: ed to returi I I: he ch I M r e m , I, hereby 
causing distress to the m inor children. 
c Defendant has repeatedly been verbally abusive : 
plaintiff, iiinl his wih 1, in 1 h«j prest'iici1 ot t ln,» minor <.1iiJ« 
and thereby causing the children emotional distress. i 
example f defendant has made derogatory statements t about 
plaintiff i n front of the chi ] dren such as, '"'" •-
you have ittie brothers and sisters all over South America? 
5
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she give good blow jobs?" Additionally, defendant recently left 
a message on plaintiff's telephone answering machine laughing and 
calling plaintiff's wife "plain and uncouth". The children can 
be heard protesting in the background. On other occasions 
defendant left insulting messages on plaintiff's answering 
machine while the children could be heard protesting in the 
background. 
d. Defendant has required the minor child Kira 
Randolph to attend counseling sessions, over Kira's objection, 
stating that Kira must go because of plaintiff's new 
relationship. 
e. Defendant has caused the minor children emotional 
distress by threatening to cut off plaintiff's visitation rights. 
The minor child Kira has discussed her distress about not having 
enough time with her father and with her counselor and her 
father. 
f. Defendant has stated that she will not allow 
visitation if plaintiff or his wife discuss visitation or custody 
issues with the minor child Kira. 
g. Defendant has told the minor children that she will 
move the Denver, Colorado
 f so that "I can have you all to 
myself," and to make visitation with plaintiff as difficult as 
possible. This has upset the minor children. 
h. Defendant has repeatedly acted in a manner to 
intentionally upset the minor children when plaintiff picks them 
6 000103 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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answer! 'n-'-sr- , ^  *_*.,. * . *<* x#i-f^ 
6. The minor children have* beei 1 greatly upset by 
defendant 5 continuing antagonistic and irrational behavior. 
Both chile * ut; • neir mother wil 1 keep 
them from their father. 
Plaintiff has observed the minor children in'leiaif ci 1 'i 
• riren are very comfortable and 
affectionate with plaintiff's wife. The minor children have 
expressed plaintiff, and - * . emen t: a nd 
happiness ,,«,.,-;, plaintili ' s recent marriage and have stated that 
they are giacl to have Lee as part of their family. 
8. The plaintiff dud his- > urrwnl spouse, Lee, who married 
April III, have discussed the situation and have agreed that: it is 
in the best interest of t he children that plainti f f reqiiest 
custody ., P l a int. i 11 be i I eves that defendant is 
not mentally or emotionally stable and that she Is unable to 
control her emotions i n dealing with her ourrofil r i re uiiistd rices, 
which rest i i «•; in emotnuwti distress to the children. In 
addition, i he defendant will continue to attempt prevent 
plaintiff from having regular anu :1 the 
children. 
9. Plaintiff believes that the children are being harmed, 
emotionally, by the irrational. ' mania of the 
defendant. Plaintili. firmly believes that there should be a 
7 0U010P 
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cuifcbdj^^ in this matter, including 
psychological evaluations, and that this Court should have an 
opportunity to make a determination as to the appropriate 
placement of the children and what is in the children's best 
interest. 
10. While conducting a custody evaluation and pursuing the 
custody action will require an additional court proceeding, it 
will not negate or invalidate the trial previously held relating 
to financial and property issues. Therefore, the defendant will 
not have been harmed by the previous trial proceeding. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the 
Court permit him to withdraw his stipulation to physical custody 
in defendant, and that he be permitted to move the Court for a 
custody evaluation and to proceed accordingly. 
DATED THIS / L^ day of ^ ft N. ^ - 1992. 
CORPORON & WILL iUMS 
/ / 
/ / 
(i ( 
, KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
/ Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATB OF* U T A H T ^ ^ ^ 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF _ _ _ _ „„. ) 
•VJf"* *^ * >rwrT T * ***? 
MARCUS RANDOLPH, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: *^- • «- - plaintiff to the above-
captioned mattorr * tic » foregoing Motion to 
Withdraw Stipulatior * Plaintiff, and that he understands the 
contents thereof, and that the same is true of his nwn personal 
UninwJedqe, except as to those matters stated upon information and 
belief, and as to those matters, he believes the same to be true. 
A7c^ A> Jfcdfa P 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH 
Plaintiff
 / 
DATED: 4f/6/? 
kp.'.0- ., 1 99,', |'er'u»n.i I I (Jay o f 
Ni'1 undersigned notary, MARCUS P RANDOLPH, 
ON TI1K I (jp 
appeared bM ore 
the signer of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW STIPULATION OF 
PLAINTIFF, who duly acknowledged to ITH « th.it he .iqneii the same 
vi i J ant ar j J J- and for its stated purpose. 
NOWflmueuc 
..STRATTON 
SbHttfUtt 
My Commission Expires: 
Cp*£frvO 
NOTARY MJBLX1 
Resid inq^WbGl hf' ( CLJLQ.^ County 
Hmm 
o o o i n s 
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'CORKTXWHEREBY CERTIFY that T =™ , " V 
t h a t
 *
 m
 employed in the offices of 
Corporon
 & willies, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
caused the foregoing VERIFIED MOTION TO WITHDRAW STIPULATION OF 
— I F F to
 b e served upon defendant b y p l a c i n g ." ^  ^ 
correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
o? r n e v f o r Defendant 
243 East 400 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
- -—it* ,
 t h e s a n e , s e a l e d , w l t h f i r s t _ c i a s s p o s t a g e 
oT 1 Tin the Tedrtes maii at sait«»— — 
on the jj" day of 4pr, j 1992. 
- - ^ 
Secretary 
0G01C0 
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C. CPR-DR 3-102 Violations 
Gillingham next contends that the trial 
court erred in concluding that his agree-
ment to divide fees with Jennings was an 
impermissible fee-splitting agreement. He 
argues that attorneys may disburse fees 
paid by their clients as they choose, and 
further points out that AFR 9(c)(2) permits 
payment of Rule 9 interns. He reasons 
that APR 9(c)(2) would be abrogated if 
iividing a contingent fee with a Rule 9 
intern constituted impermissible fee-split-
ting. 
DR 3-102 prohibits a lawyer from shar-
ing fees with a noulawyer except under 
certain narrow exceptions. The purpose of 
his rule is to prevent the possibility of 
rontrol of a lawyer by a nonlawyer. See C. 
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 510 (1986). 
)u its face, the rule does prohibit dividing 
'ees with a Rule 9 intern, since Rule 9 
nterns are "nonlawyers." 
^ A l t h o u g h the issue presented here is an 
mportant one not yet decided by our 
ourts, it has not been adequately briefed 
>y either party. Thus, because as dis-
ussed below, we need not resolve this 
ssue in deciding this appeal, we decline to 
lecide whether I)R 3-102 prohibits sharing 
ees with a Rule 9 intern. 
I). Damages 
(4J Gillingham contends that even if 
baring his contingent fee with Jennings 
id constitute impermissible fee splitting, 
he trial court erred in concluding both that 
he fee splitting affected his representation 
f the plaintiffs and that there was result-
nt damage to them. We agree. 
The trial court found that the plaintiffs 
fere damaged, reasoning that "disclosure 
D [the trial judge of) the true rate paid to 
Ir. Jennings more probably than not 
wuld have resulted in [the trial judge] 
warding greater attorneys' fees to the 
laintiff than were otherwise ob-
l ined . . . . " The court then reduced Gill-
igham's contingent fee by 25 percent, 
his was based on the court's determina-
on that "each plaintiff on a more probable 
ian not basis could have received a sum 
jual to a $2f>-30/hr. charge for Mr. Jen-
nings' services instead of an award based 
on $20/hr." 
When courts are measuring contract 
damages, uncertainty as to the extent or 
amount of damages will not preclude recov-
ery of damages where (here is no uncer-
tainty as to the existence of damage or an 
to causation. Jacqueline's Washington, 
Inc. v. Mercantile Stores Co., Inc., 80 
Wash.2d 784, 786, 498 F\2d 870 (1972). The 
trial judge in the plaintiffs' original action 
based the award of attorneys' fees on Gill-
ingham's fee affidavit. It is undisputed 
that this affidavit set forth a reasonable 
hourly rate for the services of the Rule 9 
intern at $20 per hour and accurately set 
forth his true hours. The trial court here 
determined that the trial judge in the previ-
ous action would have accepted a higher 
hourly rate. Because there was no evi-
dence to support this determination, it was 
purely speculative. 
|r,mlu sum, there is nothing in the record to 
support the court's conclusion that the la-
ter division of fees was the proximate 
cause of any harm to plaintiffs, nor any 
evidence of what damage amount might 
have been sustained. Gillingham's decision 
to share a portion of his fee appears only 
to have diminished Gillingham's share of 
attorneys fees. We therefore hold that the 
trial court erred in reducing Gillingham's 
contingent fee by an additional 25 percent 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's 
allocation of the court-awarded attorneys' 
fees and computation of the contingent fee 
but reverse the reduction of the contingent 
fee by an additional 25 percent. 
GROSSE, Acting C.J., and BAKER, J., 
concur. 
(o |MYNUMBttSVSIIM> 
CUe mi 789 P.2d 807 
57 Wash.App. 707 
j ^ I n re The MARRIAGE OF Laura Lclia 
STERN, Respondent, 
and 
Harold Loyd Singleton, Appellant. 
No. 22733-5-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
April 30. 1990. 
Former wife brought motion* to modify 
decree of dissolution, seeking sole legal and 
residential custody of children. The Supe-
rior Court, King County, Robert Dixon, J., 
entered a decree of modification in favor of 
wife. Former husband appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Baker, J., held that: (1) 
trial court finding that joint custodial ar-
rangement was not harmful as it existed 
prior to spanking incident was supported 
hy the evidence, (2) trial court finding that 
joint custodial arrangement was no longer 
workable was supported by the evidence, 
and (3) grant of income-proportionate con-
tribution to childrens' private education ex-
penses was not supported by the evidence. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and re-
manded in part. 
I. Appeal and Error <s=>766 
The appropriate! remedy for noncompli-
ance with rule which requires a party to set 
out material portions of challenged finding 
in its brief or an appendix thereto is sanc-
tions, which may include a refusal to con-
sider the claimed errors. RAF 10.3(g), 10.-
4(c). 
2. Appeal and Error <S=740(2), 758.3(9) 
The intended purpose of the rules 
which require separate assignments of er-
ror for each challenged finding, and require 
party to set out material portions of chal-
lenged finding in his brief or an appendix 
thereto, is to add order to and expedite 
appellate procedure by eliminating the la-
borious task of searching through the 
record for such matters as findings claimed 
i;u m< STKKN Wash. 8 0 7 
(Wa«lt./\pp. 1990) 
to have been made in error. RAP 10.3(g), 
10.4(c). 
3. Appeal and Error <S=»762, 766 
Appellate court considered appeal on 
the merits, despite fact that appellant did 
not set forth verbatim findings and conclu-
sions in his opening brief, where appellant 
cured the defect in his reply brief, and 
appellee offered no evidence suggesting 
she had been prejudiced by appellant's er-
ror. RAF 1.2(b), 10.3(g), 10.4(c), 18.9. 
•I. Divorce €=»164 
The courts' powers in a proceeding to 
modify a decree of dissolution are limited 
to those which may be inferred from a 
broad interpretation of the legislation that 
governs the proceeding. 
5. Infants c= 19.3(5) 
Failure by trial court to make findings 
that reflect application of each statutorily 
relevant factor in a proceeding to modify a 
custody award is error. West's RCWA 
2(i.09.2(;o. 
6. Divorce <^3()3(8) 
Trial court finding determined that 
joint custodial arrangement was not harm-
ful only as it existed prior to former hus-
band's spanking of daughter, despite fact 
that finding stated that "custodial arrange-
ment established by decree of dissolution" 
was not harmful to the children, where 
other findings of fact and conclusions of 
law confined "not harmful" language in 
finding to period between entry of original 
decree and spanking incident. West's 
RCWA 20.09.200 et seq., 20.09.2GO. 
7. Parent and Child <3=>2(18) 
While parental fitness is a primary 
concern of the court when considering mod-
ification of residential and legal custody, in 
a joint custody situation the court must be 
equally mindful of the joint custodial envi-
ronment and whether changed circumstanc-
es have rendered joint custody unworkable 
and detrimental. 
8. Divorce <s=303(7) 
Trial court finding that joint custodial 
situation was unworkable and detrimental 
to children was supported by the evidence, 
and thus trial court order modifying custo-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dy to establish sole legal and residential 
custody in mother was affirmed, even 
though both parties were fit and able par-
ents, where relationship between parties 
decayed so that children's well-being was 
at risk, father's spanking of child had left 
large bruise, father had used a favorite 
stuffed animal to wipe up urine, and re-
ports of social worker and child psychia-
trist indicated that children's care was neg-
atively impacted by differences between 
parents and that joint parenting was an 
unworkable option. 
9. Parent and Child <s=>2(!8) 
Parental fitness is just one part of the 
analysis when considering modification of 
child custody in a joint custody situation. 
West's RCWA 26.09.2G0. 
10. Parent and Child ®=>3.3(10) 
Court of Appeals will not substitute its 
own judgment for that of the trial court in 
awarding child support where the record 
shows that the trial court considered all 
relevant factors and the award was not 
unreasonable under the circumstances. 
11. Divorce «s=>3<KJ(7) 
Trial court order requiring former hus-
band to make income-proportionate contri-
bution to private educational expenses of 
children was not supported by the evidence, 
where there were no findings regarding 
need for private education, no showing of a 
want of availability of public schooling, and 
only testimony regarding comparative edu-
cational costs was that at time eldest child 
was in kindergarten and attending school 
half days it was economically practical to 
place child in full-day private school pro-
gram. 
12. Parent and Child e=>3.1(12) 
There is no per se prohibition against 
award of private school tuition for a minor 
child. 
13. Parent and Child «=>3.1(12) 
Where acceptable public schools are 
available, and there is no showing of spe-
cial circumstances justifying the need for 
private school education, the noncustodial 
parent should not be obligated to pay for 
the private education of his or her minor 
children. 
14. Divorce <3=>312.7 
Remand was required to determine 
costs and attorney fees appropriate to be 
awarded to former wife on former hus-
band's appeal, in action brought by wife 
seeking modification of joint custodial de-
cree, in which mother had been granted 
sole legal and residential custody of two 
children, even though husband's appeal 
was neither frivolous nor devoid of merit; 
record was lacking sufficient evidence as to 
relative needs and abilities of the parties. 
West's RCWA 2G.09.140. 
jrjwDavid .!. Ordell, Seattle, for appellant. 
Lowell Halverson, Halverson & Strong, 
Seattle, for respondent. 
RAKKR, Judge. 
Harold Loyd Singleton appeals from an 
order modifying a decree of dissolution and 
awarding sole legal and residential custody 
of his two children to his former wife, 
Laura Lelia Stern. Two primary issues are 
raised on appeal: (1) was modification of 
the parties' original joint custody arrange-
ment sufficiently supported by the findings 
of fact, and (2) was Singleton properly or-
dered to pay aii_[7ii!tin('oine-proportionate 
share of the minor children*' private school 
education expenses. Stern challenges the 
adequacy of Singleton's appeal on procedur-
al grounds and seeks attorney fees. 
1. FACTS 
The parties had been married for 6 years 
when their marriage was dissolved in 1986. 
By agreement, the decree of dissolution 
established joint legal and residential custo-
dy of the two children, who are now aged 6 
and 8. During the first year after the 
decree, residential custody was to alternate 
quarterly between the parties, with the 
noncustodial parent having liberal rights of 
visitation. This arrangement functioned 
smoothly for approximately (> months. 
In March 1987, Stern noticed a large 
bruise on the younger daughter's bottom. 
She questioned the elder child ami learned 
that the younger daughter had been 
spanked by her father. She also learned 
that the father had used a favorite stuffed 
animal to wipe up urine from the floor 
after the younger daughter had wet her-
self. 
Stern confronted Singleton, and lie ad-
mitted both incidents occurred. During la-
ter counselling, he also disclosed two previ-
ous incidents in which (he stuffed toy was 
used similarly as a method of toilet train-
ing. Singleton assured Stern that such 
incidents would not recur. He subsequent-
ly enrolled in and completed both parenting 
and anger management classes. 
The March incident precipitated a period 
of vigorous antagonism and noncooperation 
between the parties. (Ultimately, Stern 
brought this action to modify the decree, 
seeking sole legal and residential custody. 
Singleton counter-petitioned, asking the 
court to award exclusive custody to him 
because the present joint custodial environ-
ment had become detrimental to the chil-
drens' welfare. 
A temporary order was entered which 
maintained the parties' joint legal custodial 
status but vested residential care of the 
children in Stern. After a trial, the court 
entered JTIQH decree of modification in favor 
of Stern. This appeal followed. We affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand to the 
trial court for disposition consistent with 
this opinion. 
IN RE MAKKIA<;K OF STKRN 
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thereto. The appropriate remedy for non-
compliance is sanctions, which may include 
a refusal to consider the claimed errors. 
See Thomas i>. French, 99 Wash.2d 95, 100, 
<i.r>9 P.2d 1097 (1983). 
| 2 , 3 | The intended purpose of these 
rules is lo add order to and expedite appel-
late procedure by eliminating the laborious 
task of searching through the record for 
such matters as findings claimed to have 
been made in error. Sec French, at 100, 
<;.r>9 1*2(1 1097. While appellant did not set 
forth verbatim findings and conclusions in 
his opening brief, he cured this defect in 
his reply brief, obviating any potential in-
convenience to this court. Moreover, Stern 
offers no evidence suggesting that she has 
been prejudiced in any way by appellant's 
error. Thus, in the exercise of this court's 
discretion, pursuant to RAP 1.2(b) and 
RAP 18.9, we will consider the appeal on 
tin; merits. Sanctions are not appropriate. 
See Wiseman r. Goad if ear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 29 Wash.App. 883, 881. (J31 P.2d 976 
(1981); Minert r. I/arsco Corp., 2(i Wash. 
App. 807, 870, (ill P.2d 080 (1980). 
III. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY 
II. PROCFDURF 
Stern argues this court should not con-
sider the merits of Singleton's appeal be-
cause Singleton failed to comply with RAP 
10.3(g) and 10.4(c). 
HI RAP 10.3(g) requires separate as-
signments of error for each challenged 
finding arid further requires that each as-
signment include reference to the finding 
by number. RAP 10.4(c) requires a p«rty 
to set out the material portions of the chal-
lenged finding in its brief or an appendix 
f. In 1987 die legislature amended former RCW 
26.09.260. However, because (he entry of flic 
decree of dissolution in the instant case prc-
Singleton contends the trial court erred 
by modifying the custodial provisions of 
the decree of dissolution without finding 
that the custodial environment was detrr-
mental to_^nthe physical, mental, or emo-
tional health of the parties' minor children. 
We disagree. 
I l l Procedures relating to the modifica-
tion of a decree of dissolution are statutori-
ly prescribed. The courts' powers, there-
fore, are limited to those which may be 
inferred from a broad interpretation of the 
legislation that governs the proceeding. In 
re Marriage of Soriano, 44 Wash.App. 
420, 421, 722 P.2d 132 (1980); A meson v. 
A meson, ;W Wash.2d 99, 227 P.2d 1016 
(1951). 
RCW 20.09.200 ' sets forth the criteria 
for modification of custody awards and pro-
vides in relevant part that: 
elates the amendment, the changes therein are 
not applicable to this appeal. See RCW 26.09.-
907. 
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(1) The court shall not modify a prior 
custody decree unless it finds, upon the 
basis of facts that have arisen since the 
prior decree or that were unknown to the 
court at the time of the prior decree, that 
a change has occurred in the circum-
stances of the child or his custodian and 
that modification is necessary to serve 
the best interests of the child. In apply-
ing these standards the court shall retain 
the custodian established by the prior 
decree unless: 
(a) The custodian agrees to the modifi-
cation; 
(b) The child has been integrated into 
the family of the petitioner with the con-
sent of the custodian; or 
(c) The child's present environment is 
detrimentiil to his physical, mental, or 
emotional health and the harm likely to 
be caused by a change of environment is 
outweighed by the advantage of a 
change to the child. 
(5J Compliance with these criteria is 
mandatory. Failure by the trial court to 
make findings that reflect the application 
of each relevant factor is error. Anderson 
v. Anderson, 14 Wash.App. 306, 368, 541 
P.2d 996 (1975), review denied, 86 Wash.2d 
1009 (1970); In re Marriage of Murray, 28 
Wash.App. 187, 622 P.2d 1288 (1981); In re 
Marriage of Raugust, 29 Wash.App. 53, 
627 P.2d 558 (1981). In the context of joint 
custody, the inquiry under the statute is in 
part whether |7t„>there has been a change in 
circumstance of the "joint custodians as 
established by the decree". In re Mar-
riage of Murphy, 48 Wash.App. 196, 198-
99, 737 P.2d 1319 (1987). 
The primary concern of the courts in 
custody matters is always the welfare of 
the child. In re Rankin, 76 Wash.2d 533, 
537, 458 P.2d 176 (1969). Custodial 
changes are viewed as highly disruptive for 
the children. In re Marriage of Roorda, 
25 Wash.App. 849, 851, 611 P.2d 794 (1980). 
Both statute and case law demonstrate a 
strong presumption in favor of custodial 
continuity and against modification. RCW 
26.09.200 et seq.; In re Marriage of 
Thompson, 32 Wash.App. 418, 421, 647 
P.2d 1049 (1982); Roorda, at 851. 611 P.2d 
794; Anderson, at 368, 541 P.2d 996. 
16J In the instant case, whether or not 
the trial court set forth findings which 
sufficiently reflect the mandate of RCW 
26.09.260 turns largely upon the meaning 
of finding of fact 1.12 which provides: 
The Court finds that the custodial ar-
rangement established by the Decree of 
Dissolution is not harmful to the physi-
cal, mental or emotional health of the 
children. 
Singleton argues that this finding is at 
odds with the trial court's decision to 
award custody to Stern. He asserts that 
finding 1.12 must be read to negate the 
requirement that the court find a detriment 
as set forth in RCW 26.09.260. This inter-
pretation fails, however, to consider the 
context within which the finding was made 
and fails to consider the findings in their 
entirety. Although finding of fact 1.12 
when examined by itself could be read as 
an assessment of the joint custodial rela-
tionship in the present tense, when the 
finding is read in context, it is clear that 
the trial court was not endorsing the 
present state of the joint custodial environ-
ment. 
It is well established that, the interpreta-
tion or construction of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law presents a question of 
law for the court. Callan v. Gallon, 2 
Wash.App. 446, 448, 468 P.2d 456 (1970). 
In Callan an action was brought to deter-
mine obligations under a divorce decree. 
j^iaTlie question presented involved the in-
terpretation of language found in two para-
graphs of the decree. This court stated: 
The general rules of construction applica-
ble to statutes, contracts and other writ-
ings are used with respect to findings, 
conclusions and judgment. These rules 
include the rule that the intention of the 
court is to be determined from all parts 
of the instrument, and that the judgment 
must be read in its entirety and must be 
construed as a whole so as to give effect 
to every word and part, if possible. The 
authorities . . . refer to two canons of 
construction, here particularly pertinent 
(1) that the court is not confined to ascer-
IN RE MA It KM 
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taining I he meaning of a single word or 
phrase without regard to the entire judg-
ment, and, if necessary, the judgment 
roll, and (2) that provisions in a judgment 
that are seemingly inconsistent will be 
harmonized if possible. 
(Citations omitted.) Callan, at 448-49, 468 
P. 2d 456. We added "|i)t is not to be 
assumed that a court intended to enter a 
judgment with contradictory provisions and 
thus impair the legal operation and effect 
of so formal a document." Callan, at 449, 
I6H P.2d 456. 
The trial court's findings of fact are se-
quential. They chronicle the significant 
events and circumstances that led to the 
petition and to the court's disposition. The 
meaning of finding of fact 1.12 is made 
clear by the next finding. Finding of fact 
1.13. which qualifies finding of fact 1.12, 
provides: 
Although joint, parenting between the 
parents was successful at the beginning 
of their divorce, joint custody has not 
operated since the spanking incident. 
The unequivocal inference is that after 
the spanking incident occurred, the joint 
iMistodial arrangement had not been suc-
cessful. In our opinion, this finding con-
fines the "not harmful" language in the 
finding above to the period between entry 
of the original decree and the March inci-
dent. It is a statement of past rather than 
present condition. 
Additionally, references are made 
throughout the findings mid'conclusions 
concerning tlie decline of the custodial |,i (ar-
rangement established by the decree of 
dissolution. Finding of fact 1.11 provides 
in relevant part: 
(Tjhat while both parents are committed, 
active and competent parents for their 
daughters, the historical and present lev-
el of conflict between the parents makes 
continuation of the joint custody arrange-
ment unworkable. 
At conclusion of law 1.1. the court stated in 
relevant part: 
The Court is also mindful of RCW 26.09.-
260 and finds that changes have occurred 
in the circumstances of the children and 
the Respondent (joint custodian) and that 
• 'HOPPd- »9 
AlK OF STFRN Wash. 8 H , 
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modification of the prior Decree is neces-
sary to serve the best interests of the 
children. 
Additionally, the court concluded at 1.2: 
The conflict between the parents, aris-
ing primarily from the clearly excessive 
and inappropriate discipline the father 
administered to the child, Robin, war-
rants a change in the custodial relation-
ship between the parents. The harm 
that is likely to be caused by perpetu-
ating a clearly unworkable joint custody 
arrangement is outweighed by the advan-
tage to both children to live in a less 
conflictual environment. The only man-
ner in which that can be accomplished is 
by awarding the mother sole custody, 
both physical and legal. 
When finding of fact 1.12 is read in com-
bination with the other findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, Singleton's interpreta-
tion does not logically follow. We think a 
more reasonable interpretation of the find-
ing is that the trial court determined the 
joint custodial arrangement was not harm-
ful only as it existed prior to the spanking 
incident. 
Singleton further argues that because 
the trial court found both parties to be fit 
and able parents, and that there existed 
little likelihood of a repeat of the incidents 
which gave rise to the petition for modifica-
tion, no detriment to the children's well-be-
ing could be found in the original custodial 
arrangement. Singleton cites conclusion of 
law 1.7 in support: 
The court also finds, however, that 
both parents would be fit and proper 
persons to have custody of their daugh-
ters and each would serve their daugh-
ters' interests well. Roth parents desire 
custody and both would provide visita-
tion to the other. The children's views 
arc not able to be considered because 
they are so young. However, they are 
bonded to both parents and have ex-
pressed to others a desire to be with both 
parents. They have |7ir,developed signifi-
cant and important relationships with 
both parents and have, apparently, ad-
justed well with both parents, notwith-
standing the conflict between them. The 
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Court finds there' is little likelihood of a 
repeat of the incidents giving rise to this 
Petition. 
|7J Singleton's argument, however, 
steers wide of the real issue. Certainly, 
parental fitness is a primary concern of the 
court when considering modification of res-
idential and legal custody. See Anderson, 
at 366, 541 P.2d 1)96. In a joint custody 
situation, however, the court must be 
equally mindful of the "joint custodial envi-
ronment" and whether changed circum-
stances have rendered joint custody un-
workable and detrimental. 
(81 In In re Marriage of Murphy, 48 
Wash.App. 196, 737 P.2d 1319 (1987), a 
substantial change in circumstances was 
occasioned by the move of one joint custo-
dial parent to another state. Although the 
trial court specifically found both parents 
were fit and maintained a good relationship 
with their child, it also found that alternat-
ing physical custody under the changed 
conditions, particularly where the child was 
approaching school age, was not feasible. 
The court therefore determined that the 
"present environment" was detrimental to 
the child. Murphy, at 199, 737 P.2d 1319. 
(91 Murphy establishes that a finding 
of detriment to the child in his or her 
present environment need not be based 
upon the parenting of either party, but may 
arise from a change in the joint custodial 
environment. Such is the situation in the 
instant case. The relationship between the 
parties decayed so that the children's well-
being was at risk. Substantial evidence in 
the record supports the trial court's deter-
mination that the joint custodial arrange-
ment was no longer workable. The trial 
court had before it the reports of Alice 
Probert, a family court services social 
worker, and Dr. Dunne, a court-appointed 
child psychiatrist. Ms. Probert reported 
"[b]ecause of the high level of conflict and 
strong difference, [of opinion about 
management and care of the children] the 
children's care has been impacted negative-
ly. " j m D r . Dunne concluded " . . . thus the 
thought [of] joint parenting would be an 
optimal recommendation. However, given 
the historical and present level of conflict 
between the parents, this recommendation 
would be unworkable at the present time." 
Parental fitness is but one part of the 
analysis when considering modification in a 
joint custody situation. In this case, it is 
not determinative. 
Singleton maintains, however, that even 
if we were to affirm the trial court's find-
ing that the conflict and lack of cooperation 
between the parents made the joint custodi-
al arrangement unworkable, such a finding 
is not a sufficient ground upon which to 
modify the decree. We would not readily 
countenance a situation where one party 
undermined a joint custodial arrangement 
simply by refusing to cooperate, or by 
claiming an inability to get along with or 
trust the other party. But that is not the 
situation here. Ample testimony detailed 
the parties' history of conflict and the dam-
aging change in the joint custodial environ-
ment as a result of the March incident. In 
our opinion, unworkability in this case di-
rectly relates to the welfare of the children 
involved. Changes in the conditions or cir-
cumstances between Singleton and Stern 
would have been of little moment had they 
not affected the welfare of the children. 
The record contains substantial evidence to 
support the court's finding that the best 
interests of the children required a change 
in custody. Fairly read, the court's find-
ings reflect the application of the factors 
set forth in RCW 26.09.260. The order 
modifying custody is affirmed. 
IV. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT 
As a part of its decree modifying custo-
dy, the trial court modified support. In 
addition to monthly child support, the order 
requires appellant to contribute a percent 
of the private educational expenses of the 
children. Conclusion of law 3.3 provides as 
follows: 
The parents should contribute to the 
child care and private education expenses 
of their children in the same proportion 
and in the same ratio as indicated by 
their respective incomes jTppresently 59% 
(Respondent) and 41% (Petitioner). 
There appears to be little difference in 
this incremental expense whether the 
Cllc as 
I'hildren are in day can* or attending 
private Catholic school and, indeed, the 
schooling expense may be less than main-
taining the children in public school and 
then having to pay for before and after 
school child care. 
Singleton assigns error to this finding 2 and 
argues it lacks evidentiary support in the 
record. We agree. 
"In Washington, findings of fact sup-
ported by substantial evidence will not be 
disturbed on appeal." Bering r. Share, 
1"6 Wash.2d 212. 220. 721 P.2d 918. (10H6) 
vert, denied, 479 U.S. 1050, 107 S.Ct. 940, 
93 LKd.2d 990 (1987): Thorndike v. Hespe-
rian Orchards, hie., 54 Wash.2d 570, 575, 
313 I\2d 183 (1959). If the record contains 
evidence of "sufficient quantum to per-
suade a fair-minded, rational person of the 
truth of a declared premise", substantial 
evidence exists. /// re Snyder, 85 Wash.2d 
b2. 185-86, 532 l\2d 278 (1975). 
1101 The amount of child support rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Tins court will not substitute its own judg-
ment for that of the trial court where the 
record shows that the trial court considered 
all relevant factors and the award is not 
unreasonable under the circumstances. Iu 
rr Marriage of Nicholson, 17 Wash.App. 
110. 119, 561 l\2d 1116 (1977). 
fill In the instant case, the trial court 
made its award on the basis that no mea-
surable difference existed between the 
costs of day care and private school. The 
only testimony regarding comparative edu-
cational costs was that at the time the 
eldest child was in kindergarten and at-
tending school half days, it was economical-
ly practical to place her in a full-day private 
school program because the costs were 
roughly equaled by the reduced cost of day 
care. There was no testimony regarding, 
and it appears that the trial court did not 
consider, the tuition and day care cost dif-
ferential when both children were in school 
full time. Nor does it jrjxappear that the t ri-
al court considered the need, if any, that the 
children be placed in a private rather than 
public school. 
"»•-•• '• O l O 
2.1 807 (l\.isli.A|»p. |»WO) , 
We have found no cases in Washington 
specifically addressing the minor child/pri-
vate school tuition issue. The case of 
Smith r. Pontius, 119 Wash. 211, 205 P. 
381 (1922), is, however, factually analo-
gous. In Pontius, the court held that a 
divorced husband was not liable to the wife 
for expenses in maintaining an insane child 
in a private asylum. There, an ex-spouse 
brought an action seeking reimbursement 
for sums expended by her in support and 
maintenance of the parties' mentally ill 
child. The child was adjudged insane 
shortly after reaching the age of majority. 
At that time he was committed to the state-
run institution in Steilacoom. Several 
years later the mother petitioned for the 
child's parole. Against the wishes of the 
father, the petition was granted. There-
after, the mother kept the child in private 
sanitariums until she was financially no 
longer able to do so. The court ruled that 
where a child had been regularly commit-
ted to a state institution and there was no 
showing that the child was not properly 
treated while in the s ta tes care, nor that in 
a private sanitarium the child would receive 
better care, it was not necessary to the 
child's welfare that he reside in a private 
institution. Thus, the money expended for 
the child's maintenance was itself not rea-
sonably necessary and the father was un-
der no legal obligation to pay. Pontius, at 
213-14. 205 P. 381. 
2. Although labelled a conclusion of la tin 
A similar rationale was offered by a Cali-
fornia court with regard to the noncustodi-
al parent's obligation to provide for the 
private education of his or her minor chil-
dren. In /// re Marriage of Aylesworth, 
165 Cal.Kptr. 389, 394, 106 Cal.App.3d 869 
(1980), the court identified two primary 
conditions which must exist prior to an 
award for private education expenses: 
demonstrated need of the child, and the 
parent's ability to pay. See Straub v. 
Straub, 29 Cal.Rptr. 183, 213 Cal.App.2d 
792 (1963). Need may be assessed by de-
termining whether the child has equal ac-
cess to a publicjTj.iSchool education, and, if 
so. whether due to the peculiar circum-
lonilusion is primarily a finding of fact. 
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stances of the child it is in his or her "best in-
terests" to instead attend private school. 
In Aylesworth, one of the parties' chil-
dren was epileptic, a condition which prior 
to receiving regular medication caused him 
to miss significant time from school, and 
when in attendance, to be the subject of 
ridicule from his classmates. The child 
was placed by the mother in a private 
school. In upholding the trial court's grant 
of tuition costs in favor of the mother, the 
appellate court ruled: 
[I]t is a legitimate and reasonable infer-
ence from respondent's testimony that 
the closer pergonal attention afforded 
Duke at Crossroads School is of personal 
benefit to him in helping to alleviate his 
past anxieties related to school, and in 
helping him to cope with and adjust to 
his need for medication and all the at-
tendant psychological problems accompa-
nying such an illness in a young man. 
Moreover, this finding is not inconsistent 
with the court's refusal of [the mother's] 
request for private tuition for Duke's 
sister, Cynthia, who has never attended 
private school and shows no need or evi-
dence that such attendance would be of a 
more personal benefit to her than it 
would be to any child in general. 
Aylesivorth, 165 Cal.Rptr. at 394. 
In the case at bench, there are no find-
ings regarding the need for a private edu-
cation. Nor are there findings that any 
benefit shall inure to these children from 
attending a private school that will not 
inure to them from attending a public one. 
The trial court did find that there was 
"little difference" between the costs of at-
tending private school full-days and attend-
ing public school half-days with the remain-
der spent in day care. However, no finding 
was made comparing the costs of tuition 
and day care with both children enrolled in 
school full time. 
Conspicuously absent from Stern's brief 
is any mention of the comparative costs 
between public and private schooling with 
)r without day care. Stern concedes, how-
?ver, that with both children in school full 
;ime, day care costs will diminish to a frac-
tion of that required at the time of the 
modification. 
I no Assuming it to be true that day care 
costs with both children in school full time 
are nominal, what remains is the cost dif-
ferential between public and private 
schools. Singleton, in his motion for recon-
sideration before the trial court, set forth a 
tuition and day care cost schedule that 
plainly evidenced an appreciable difference 
in private school expenses over that of 
public schools. In the absence of a show-
ing of need or want of availability of public 
schooling, no substantial evidence can be 
found to support the trial court's award. 
As a result, the court exceeded the limits of 
its discretion. 
[12, 13J There is no per se prohibition 
against the award of private school tuition 
for a minor child. Factors such as family 
tradition, religion, and past attendance at a 
private school, among others, may present 
legitimate reasons to award private school 
tuition expenses in favor of the custodial 
parent. However, the court's findings do 
not address such circumstances. Where 
acceptable public schools an? available, and 
there is no showing of special circumstanc-
es justifying the need for private school 
education, the noncustodial parent should 
not be obligated to pay for the private 
education of his or her minor children. 
The grant of an income-proportionate 
contribution to the childrens' private edu-
cation expenses was error. As to that por-
tion of the court's decree, we reverse. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES 
[Ml Stern requests her costs and attor-
ney fees on appeal. This court may award 
attorney fees under RCW 20.09.140 after 
specifically considering the financial re-
sources of both parties. In re Marriage of 
Belsby, 51 Wash.App. 711, 719, 754 P.2d 
1209 (1988). We must then balance the 
needs of one party against the other par-
ty's ability to pay. In re Marriage of 
Young, 18 Wash.App. 402, 400, 509 P.2d 70 
(1977). Additionally, we may also consider 
the merits of the appeal itself. Chapman 
v. Perera, 41 Wash.App. 444, 455-56, 704 
I'.2d 1224, review denied, 
1020 (1985). 
j^-iContrary to Stern's claim, the appeal was 
neither frivolous nor devoid of merit. 
However, the record before this court is 
lacking sufficient evidence as to the rela-
tive needs and abilities of the parties. We 
therefore remand this issue to the trial 
court to determine whether costs and fees 
are appropriate and, if so, in what amount. 
STATE v. WOOUJRICHT Wash. 8 1 5 
C l t e a s 7 K 9 P.2«l HIS (Wash .App. 1990) 
104 Wash.2d by arresting officer or under his supervi-
sion. 
WINSOR WEBSTER, J.J., concur. 
2. Automobiles e»355(6) 
Chemical tests are neither necessary 
nor required to prove intoxication for driv-
ing while intoxicated purposes. 
II. Criminal Law ©=>7O0<9) 
State's duty to preserve material evi-
dence for defendant does not require inves-
tigating officers to seek out exculpatory 
evidence or conduct test to exonerate de-
fendant. 
57 Wash.App. 6^7 
jwwSTATK of Washington, Respondent. 
v. 
.Icancane WOOIJiRICHT. Petitioner. 
No. 2:*955-l-I. 
Court of Appeals of Washington. 
Division 1. 
April ;M, 1990. 
Driver, charged with driving while in-
toxicated, filed motion to dismiss. The Dis-
trict Court granted motion, and State ap-
pealed. The Superior Court, King County, 
Patricia Aitken. .1.. reversed Seattle District 
Court's dismissal, and appeal was taken. 
The Court of Appeals, Scholfield, J., held 
that: (1) implied consent law did not re-
quire that State perforin breathalyzer test, 
and (2) failure of trooper to administer 
breathalyzer test to driver was not arbi-
trary action or governmental misconduct 
authorizing dismissal of driving while in-
toxicated charges. 
Judgment affirmed. 
I. Automobiles <3=>II5 
Implied consent statute does not re-
quire that defendant arrested for driving 
while intoxicated be given breathalyzer 
test, but merely provides that defendant is 
deemed to have given her consent and es-
tablishes certain guidelines for testing in 
event that test was used or sought to be 
used. 
5. Automobiles 0=»J15 
Defendant charged wiih driving while 
intoxicated had right to additional tests ad-
ministered by qualified person of her own 
choosing, where defendant had in fact 
agreed to submit to breath test adminis-
tered by arresting officer, although officer 
later determined that working machine was 
not available. 
(». Automobiles C=>JI5 
Failure of trooper to administer 
breathalyzer test to driver charged with 
driving while intoxicated was not arbitrary 
action or governmental misconduct autho-
rizing dismissal of driving while intoxicated 
charges; driver did not have right to such 
tests, and no test was given because officer 
was unable to find functioning machine 
after two attempts and driver had been in 
custody for lengthy amount of time. 
1. Automobiles e=».|22 j ^ Albert A. Rinaldi, Seattle, for Jeaneane 
Statutory scheme relative to breath W o » , l , r i « h l -
test contains no language which gives sus- Pamela Mohr, David Rruce, Deputy King 
pect right to breath test to be administered County Prosecutors, Seattle, for State. 
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MARCUS P. RANDOLPH vs. HART E. RANDOLPH 
Civil No. 914902308DA 
DEFENDANT'S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Rent 
Food and Household Supplies 
Utilities (pays gas only) 
Telephone 
Laundry and Cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical Expenses 
Dental Expenses (deductible) 
Medical Insurance (COBRA) 
Child Care ($60/mo, 8 mos/yr) 
Cosgriff 
Entertainment 
Auto Expense 
Incidentals 
School Expenses 
TOTAL 
$ 750.00 
450.00 
75.00 
40.00 
20.00 
150.00 
98.00 
8.00 
139.00 
40.00 
168.00 
200.00 
80.00 
161.00 
177.00 
$2,556.00 
calculations set forth on next page 
2 PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
II 
.& 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Medical Expenses: 
Psychological: 
Ben Dobbin (2 @ $60) 
Less Insurance Coverage 
Paid by Defendant 
Miscellaneous: 
Less Insurance Coverage 
Paid by Defendant 
Amortization of Deductible: 
$350 : 12 
$ 120.00 
50% 
$ 40.00 
801 
$ 
$ 
1_ 
60.00 
8.00 
30.00 
TOTAL MONTHLY MEDICAL EXPENSES 98.00 
Cosgriff (as received 10/8 from Rosie): 
Kira: Tuition 
Books and Fees 
Erika: Tuition 
Books and Fees 
Total Cosgriff per year 
TOTAL COSGRIFF PER MONTH 
Incidentals: 
Haircuts (1/mo each) 
Relatives Gifts (1/mo) 
Christmas ($100/girl) 
Birthdays ($100/girl) 
Family Christmas ($200/year) 
Church 
Alcohol 
TOTAL INCIDENTALS PER MONTH 
$ 965.00 
125.00 
$ 850.00 
75.00 
$ 50.00 
20.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
20.00 
20.00 
$1,090.00 
$ 925.00 
$2,015.00 
$ 168.00 
161.00 
School (University of Utah): 
(Based on 12 credit hours per quarter) 
In-state full-time tuition 
Books 
$ 557.00/quarter 
$ 150.00/quarter 
Total Quarterly Expenses 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES 
$ 707.00 
$ 177.00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
